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PERSONHOOD INTERESTS OF THE DECEASED AND HIS OR
HER KIN IN DISPOSING OF THE DEAD AND ASSIGNING
IDENTITY IN DEATH

Mary L. Clark*
This Article introduces a critique of the ways in which the
state's exercise of authority to govern the disposition of the dead
can disrupt fundamental personhood interests of the deceased
and his or her kin in burying the dead and assigning identity in
death. In Part I, I focus on the state's use of power to shape (or
constrain) ideas of honor and identity in death through: (1) the
assertion of ever-expanding federal authority over repatriation
and burial of the dead, including regulation of which family
members can be buried alongside whom in U.S. national
cemeteries; (2) disposition of the unclaimed dead; and (3)
disposition of the incarcerateddead, including the executed. In
Part II, I examine the federal government's exercise of authority
to shape ideas of race and identity in death through the
repatriation (or not) of mortal remains under the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, which
provides for the return from federal custody of mortal remains to
tribalcommunities.
In introducing this critique, I seek to reveal some of the most
deeply entrenched tensions among forces of nationalism,
patriotism, race, religion, ethnicity, family, and personhood at
stake in burying the dead. I argue that these tensions arise in
significant part from questions of who gets to control the
disposition of the dead and who gets to assign final identity in
death.
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"Do not, beloved of Zeus, make me sit on a chair while Hektor
lies yet forlorn among the shelters; rather with all speed give
him back, so my eyes may behold him..."
- Priam, pleading for the return of his dead son Hektor's
body
The Iliad'
INTRODUCTION

This Article introduces a critique of the ways in which laws and
practices governing the state's disposition of the dead can disrupt the
fundamental personhood interests of the deceased and his or her kin
in burying the dead and assigning identity in death, focusing on four
phenomena in particular:

*

Visiting Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law.

1.

HOMER, THE ILIAD 489-90 (Richard Lattimore trans. 1951).
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1. ever-expanding federal authority over repatriation and
burial of the dead, including regulation of which family
members can be buried alongside whom in U.S. national
cemeteries;
2. disposition of the unclaimed dead;
3. disposition of the incarcerated dead, including the executed;
and
4. federal implementation of the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act, providing for the return
from federal custody of Native American mortal remains to
tribal communities.
In introducing this critique, I seek to reveal some of the most deeply
entrenched tensions among forces of nationalism, patriotism, race,
ethnicity, religion, family, and personhood at stake in burying the
dead. I argue that these tensions arise in significant part from
questions of who gets to control the disposition of the dead and who
thereby controls final assignment of identity in death.2 Throughout, I
am particularly concerned for the disparate race, class, and gender
effects that state practices can and have produced.
In highlighting tensions between forces of nationalism and
personhood, for example, I wish to make clear my intention not to
overstate a dichotomy between them, where such binary
constructions run the risk of oversimplifying, and under-enriching,
the analysis.3 Instead, I argue for recognition of a range of possible
attachments in death, extending from the intimately personal to the
national and beyond, recognizing that, for some, their strongest
attachment in death may be to nation-state, while not so for others.
What matters at the end of the day is that the law facilitate the
personhood and agency interests of the deceased and his or her kin to
control the disposition of the dead and assignment of final identity in
death, absent a valid countervailing state interest, where such
interests may include concerns for public health, nuisance, or the full
and proper conduct of criminal investigations, which may well
necessitate autopsies or exhumations contrary to the wishes of the
individuals involved.4

2. While almost all cultures bury their dead, they vary widely in how they do so,
from religious to civil ceremonies, from interment of the body to interment of cremated
remains, etc. See, e.g., Robert Fulton & Robert Bendiksen, Introduction to Grief and
the Process of Mourning, in DEATH AND IDENTITY 108 (Robert Fulton & Robert
Bendiksen, eds., 3d ed. 1994).
3. As Leti Volpp and others have emphasized, these types of dichotomous
constructions are often cramped and false. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, Feminism versus
Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1204 (2001).
4. In addition to these areas in which the state holds valid interests in regulating
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I became interested in thinking about the symbolic meanings
associated with control over the disposition of the dead through my
exposure to personhood property theory.5 I found its attention to the
ways in which property helps constitute the self, while at the same
time reflecting or expressing the self, a critical intervention in our
understanding of what property is, why it matters, and what the role
of law should be in regulating human attachments to property, where
so much of the rhetoric to date has been market-based. Here, and
elsewhere,6 I seek to articulate a critique of law's regulation of
personhood attachments to property to supplement dominant
economic understandings of what property means and why it
matters.
Since my critique focuses principally on the tension among
claims to ownership-like dominion and control over the dead, I'll
start by highlighting some basic property law principles governing
the status and treatment of dead bodies. Most importantly, dead
bodies are not considered property under the law. Rather, they are
deemed res nullius, literally "a thing owned by no one."7 Still, most
the disposition of the dead, there are other areas in which the state holds affirmative
obligations to bury the dead, as for example in the context of the unclaimed dead, see
Part I.B., infra, and treatment of enemy dead in time of war. On this second point, the
state is obliged to refrain from despoiling the enemy dead and is instead obliged to
preserve the enemy dead, which may include providing for their temporary burial. See
infra note 64.
5. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood,34 STAN. L. REV.
957 (1982); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities (1996); Margaret
Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Property (1993). Stated briefly, Radin, drawing on Hegel,
argues that individuals must have control over certain items of property in their
immediate environment to become fully constituted selves, i.e., to flourish as humans.
Radin grounds her personhood theory in an intuitive understanding that different
items of property have different effects on an individual's self-constitution. Her
intuition is that
Most people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves.
These objects are closely bound up with personhood because they are part of
the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world.
They may be as different as people are different, but some common examples
might be a wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom, or a house.
Radin, Property and Personhood, supra, at 959. While Radin does not extend her
analysis to interests in the disposition of dead bodies, I argue that her insight for the
constitutive power of property for personhood applies at least as significantly here as
to any other interest in property.
6. See, e.g., Mary L. Clark, Treading on Hallowed Ground, KY L.J. (2005/06)
(examining modifications to property doctrine made in recognition of human
attachments to sites of death and burial).
7. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditionsof
Public Property in the InformationAge, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 92 (2003); see
also Michele Goodwin, Rethinking Legislative Consent Law?, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 257, 293-99 (2002) (noting disagreement over who owns body after death and
whether cadaver is subject to traditional property rights); Tanya Herndndez, The
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states now allow for a decedent to provide in his or her will for the
preferred disposition of his or her body at death. Likewise, most
states recognize a quasi-property interest in the deceased's body held
by his or her legally recognized kin in the period immediately
following death to oversee the disposition of the body, whether by
cremation, interment, or both.8 Those granted the right to bury the
dead are granted the related right to have the deceased lie
undisturbed,9 violation of which gives rise to claims in tort or
criminal law by these same kin.1o Thus, just as modern law treats a
given item of property as a bundle of sticks, with each stick
representing a different right, such as use, possession, etc., and with
the potential for multiple parties simultaneously holding different
sticks in the bundle, so too with dead bodies, where the next of kin
hold some, but not all, of the sticks in the bundle.1 I will return to
this metaphor in the end in proposing reforms to laws and practices
regarding the disposition of the dead.

Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 971-74 (1999) (same).
8. See, e.g., Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 2002)
(reversing dismissal of parents' section 1983 claim that property had been taken
without due process where deceased children's corneas had been removed by county
coroner without notice or consent of parents; court concluded that, as matter of
common law in California and nationally, next of kin have exclusive right to possess
bodies of deceased family members between death and disposition by burial or
cremation); see also Goodwin, supra note 7, at 258-60 (highlighting disproportionate
failure to obtain consent from survivors of deceased of color for corneal and other
tissue removal).
9. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-14-57-1 (West 2005) (dictating that consent of
surviving spouse or parents is required for disinterment, disentombment, or
disinurnment of mortal remains on property owned by a third party).
10. See, e.g., Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriationof Native American Cultural
Property, 72 IND. L. J. 723, 762 (1997) [hereinafter Harding, Justifying Repatriation]
("Any tortious interference with the right, such as an unlawful autopsy, improper
burial, or unauthorized reinterment gives rise to an action for damages including
damages for mental distress. The surviving spouse or next of kin also retains a limited
property right in the spot where the individual is buried. Beyond this, human remains
belong to the earth.").
11. See, e.g., Hernandez, supra note 7, at 971-94 (asking, "Who owns death and
why do we care? The question of who owns death is implicitly deliberated each time a
legal dispute ensues over who can direct the manner of a decedent's burial. There is no
definitive legal rule as to who has the right to control the disposal of mortal remains
because there is no agreement as to who owns a body after death or whether the
cadaver is subject to traditional property rights. . . . 'The courts have talked of a
somewhat dubious 'property right' to the body, usually in the next of kin, which did not
exist while the decedent was living, cannot be conveyed, can be used only for the one
purpose of burial, and not only has no pecuniary value but is a source of liability for
funeral expenses. It seems reasonably obvious that such 'property' is something
evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that it is in reality the personal
feelings of the survivors which are being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no
one but a lawyer."') (quoting W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 44 (2d ed. 1955)).
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In "The Property of Death," Tanya Hernandez examines this
quasi-property right to the body held by the deceased's legally
recognized survivors - most commonly, the spouse, adult children, or
parents.12 Hernandez focuses on the tension that can erupt between
the deceased's interests and those of his or her legally recognized kin,
where the deceased might have indicated a desire to have his or her
body donated to science, while the survivors want a body to
memorialize and bury; or where the deceased was estranged from his
or her legally recognized kin, and/or had formed closer ties to those
not legally recognized as holding a quasi-property interest in the
body, as for example, in the context of a gay partnership not
recognized by law. While Hernandez importantly addresses the
tension arising between the deceased and his or her legally
recognized kin for control over the disposition of the dead, my
concern here is for the ways in which the state disrupts the
personhood interests of the deceased and his or her kin in the
disposition of the dead through the state's imposition of its own will,
needs, and interests over those of the individuals involved.
In each of the issue areas examined below, the state's imposition
of its interest in the dead has the potential to disrupt the personhood
and/or agency interests of the deceased and his or her kin. In
attempting to explain why these disruptions occur, commentators,
including historians of religion, classicists, anthropologists, and
sociologists, have suggested that conflict between the family and the
larger polity over disposition of the dead can arise where the family's
memorialization of the dead is thought excessively personal or
otherwise out of step with the polity's interests in burying the dead,
including interests in molding ideas of the "state" and inspiring and
rewarding loyalty and sacrifice in service of the state.13 Thus,
historian of religion Peter Brown observes:
[T]he kin can express concern for the dead to a degree, or in a
manner, that might conflict with the needs of the community as
a whole. Excessive celebration of funerary rites, undue
expressions of loyalty to the memory or to the tombs of the
dead, could become a lever by which one group might hope to
assert themselves, in the name of the departed, among their
living fellows. 14
According to Brown, societies throughout history have responded to
these "undue expressions" of familial affection for, and loyalty to, the
dead with varying degrees of regulation, where "[t]he fluctuation [in

12.

See Hernandez supra note 7, passim.
See PETER BROWN, THE CULT OF THE SAINTS: ITS RISE AND FUNCTION IN LATIN
CHRISTIANITY 24-25 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1981).
14. Id. at 24.
13.
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treatment] betrays the determination of some societies to cut down to
size the memory of those who, in being dead, had ceased to be active
Such struggles for
participants in social and political life . ."15
control over the disposition of the dead and assignment of identity in
death will be examined throughout.
KEEP YOUR HANDS OFF MY (DEAD) BODY PART I: IMPOSITION OF STATE
AUTHORITY TO SHAPE (OR CONSTRAIN) IDEAS OF HONOR AND
IDENTITY IN DEATH

A.

Assertion of ever-expandingfederal authorityover
repatriationand burialof the dead

Among other questions I take up in this Article is how laws and
practices regarding the founding and administration of cemeteries for
the U.S. military dead have been used to construct particular
understandings of the nation, elevating ideas of nationalism,
patriotism, self-less citizenship, and sacrifice in service of country
over a range of other attachments in death, including to self, family,
friends, religion, community, and otherwise.16
One facet of my feminist-inspired critique centers on the often
asserted, even widely assumed, supremacy of national and
nationalist interests over attachments to personhood, family,
friendship, or community in the death and burial of soldiers.17

15. Id. at 24-25.
16. Currently, there are 138 national cemeteries in the U.S., with 122 operated by
the Department of Veterans Affairs, fourteen by the Department of the Interior (e.g.,
Antietam National Cemetery and Gettysburg National Cemetery), and two by the
Department of the Army (specifically, Arlington National Cemetery and the Soldiers'
and Airmen's Home Cemetery, both in the metro Washington area). National
Cemetery Administration, Burial & Memorial Benefits, http://www.cem.va.gov. There
are also twenty-four U.S. national cemeteries overseas, principally in Europe, with a
few in North Africa and the Philippines. There are no U.S. national cemeteries in
continental Asia or South America. See American Battle Monuments Commission,
http://www.abmc.gov/abmc2.htm.
17. The feminist strand of my critique draws, for example, on Kathryn Abrams'
work on the centrality of agency to human flourishing. See Kathryn Abrams, From
Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
805 (1999); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995). It is also importantly informed by Martha
Albertson Fineman's writings on the legal and political understanding of the "family,"
see, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY (New Press 2004); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER,

THE

SEXUAL

FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER].

TRAGEDIES

(Routledge 1995) [hereinafter

Emblematic of this assumption of the supremacy of national interests over
those of family was the New York Times' 2004 Memorial Day editorial, "By the Light of
Other Wars," asserting that despite conflicting views on the merits of the U.S.-led war
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Insufficient attention has been given to the personhood and agency
interests of the individual soldier and his or her family in death,
where "family" should be understood throughout this Article as those
individuals who the dead him or herself identify as "family," whether
united by blood, marriage, or otherwise, rather than the significantly
more cramped definition of family currently used in national
cemetery burials.18 Over the last century and a half, American
soldiers' dead bodies have been used increasingly to shape
understandings of national identity through the ever-expanding
assertion of federal authority over disposition of the dead and the
concomitant marginalization of the family and other intimate
connections. Indeed, the historic movement away from family burials
toward state-supervised burials, whether actually state-sponsored, as
in the case of the national cemeteries, or simply state-regulated,
through the rise of the licensed mortuary industry, is a movement
writ large away from female oversight of death and burial toward
state control and is likewise a concern of my critique.19 At the same
time, I take issue with the way in which the state promotes certain
understandings of the feminization of mourning, specifically the
assumption that birth mothers eclipse all other kin in their suffering
at soldiers' deaths, and that these same mothers, and no others,
should be recognized as an official matter for sacrificing their kin to
the national cause.
While ultimately critiquing as undue the emphasis on
nationalism in death, I recognize nationalism's importance to our
understanding of human affairs. Benedict Anderson in Imagined
Communities, for example, highlights the ways in which individuals
make sense of the world today largely through the lens of
nationalism, replacing for many religion as their primary organizing
principle.20 While careful to note that nationalism did not simply
supplant religion as a tool for constructing experience,21 Anderson

in Iraq, no one would contest the fact that an American soldier's strongest attachment
in death is to the military: "One of the shocks many grieving families must deal with is
the sudden knowledge that this military coherence was stronger than anything the
family itself could offer." Editorial, By the Light of Other Wars, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
2004, at 16.
18. See Part I.A.4. infra.
19.

See, e.g.,

GARY LADERMAN,

THE SACRED REMAINS: AMERICAN ATTITUDES

TOWARD DEATH, 1799-1883, at 145 (1996) (noting with regard to burial of the Civil
War dead, "the confluence of interest by doctors and army officials in the scrutinized
corpse led to the further legitimation of state, rather than familial or religious, control
over the bodies of the dead and the fragmented body parts of wounded soldiers.").
20. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES:
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 11 (rev. ed. 1991).

REFLECTIONS ON THE

21. Id. at 12 (stating, "Needless to say, I am not claiming that the appearance of
nationalism towards the end of the eighteenth century was 'produced' by the erosion of
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argues that the rise of nationalism coincided with fundamental
changes in cultural understandings that simultaneously limited the
influence of religion: "Beneath the decline of sacred communities,
languages and lineages, a fundamental change was taking place in
modes of apprehending the world, which, more than anything else,
made it possible to 'think' the nation."22 Anderson underscores
nationalism's influence by highlighting the "profoundly selfsacrificing love" individuals hold for their countries, manifested in
part through their willingness to die for the state. 23 While Anderson's
argument regarding the role of religion in the face of nationalism is
thrown into question by the rise of religious fundamentalisms and
contemporary wars fought in their name, 24 it is nevertheless fair to
say that for many today, their sense of themselves in the world is
defined at least as much by nation as by religion. Whether
nationalism then subsumes personhood in death is another matter
altogether, where I argue that the law must respect the individual's
choice of identity in death, absent a valid state interest to the
contrary, where sometimes that choice will be to align with the
nation and sometimes not.
On a related note, sociologist Max Weber suggested that death in
the name of country, specifically death in war, differs from all other
deaths in that "the individual can believe that he knows he is dying
'for' something. The why and the wherefore of his facing death can,
as a rule, be so indubitable to him that the problem of the 'meaning'
of death does not even occur to him."25 Building on Weber's
argument, one recent commentator observed, "that no contemporary
sociology of death could be complete without a careful examination of
a society's readiness and willingness to go to war or an investigation
of the social conditions and values that produce such willingness."26
Mindful of this question, this Article examines some of the laws and
practices governing the disposition of the military dead that have
shaped understandings of honor and identity in death in war, and
thereby informed individuals' willingness to die in this manner.
Before turning to the first of my examples of the assertion of
ever-expanding federal authority over disposition of the dead, i.e., the
rise of the national cemetery in the Civil War era, I should note that,
religious certainties, or that this erosion does not itself require a complex explanation.
Nor am I suggesting that somehow nationalism historically 'supersedes' religion.").
22. Id. at 22.
23. Id. at 141.
24. Thanks to Martha Fineman for highlighting this critique of Anderson.
25. Max Weber, Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions (1915),
quoted in Greg Owen et al., The Sociology of Death:A Historical Overview, 1875-1985,
in DEATH AND IDENTITY, supra note 2, at 84-85.

26.

Owen, et al., supra note 25, at 89.
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in many respects, these first examples-involving the founding of
national cemeteries here and abroad-are different in kind from
those that follow insofar as these first examples demonstrate the
federal government's burgeoning impulse toward using dead bodies
to promote its own understanding of, and needs for, the nation, while
later examples more specifically demonstrate the ways in which the
state's imposition of its interests in disposing of the dead and
assigning identity in death can disrupt the personhood and agency
interests of the individuals involved.
1.

The establishment of U.S. national cemeteries in the
Civil War era

The first national cemeteries in the continental United States
were established during and immediately after the Civil War, where
the new cemeteries constituted a Union effort to assert an
understanding, or ideology, of the "nation" in the face of Southern
secession.27 Striving to bury their dead separately, the Union and
Confederacy drew on widely different ideologies in their cemetery
iconography regarding the objects of their sacrifice.28 Likewise, white
and black troops were buried separately, thus segregated in death as
they were in life.
More specifically for my purposes here, the establishment of the
new national cemeteries saw the north more often than not burying
its dead in southern territory with memorials to the Union troops'
valor and sacrifice in service of the nation. While most of the fighting,
and much of the loss of life, occurred on southern soil, it wasn't
without question that the northern dead would be buried in the
south, where some families insisted on retrieving their dead and
burying them back at home. Moreover, the siting of Arlington
National Cemetery, the Union's largest and most important
cemetery, on the grounds of Robert E. Lee's family estate was not a
matter of convenience or happenstance in death, but, rather, an
intentional assertion of the nation's interests in honoring the dead,
27. See, e.g., G. KURT PIEHLER, REMEMBERING WAR THE AMERICAN WAY 2
(Smithsonian Inst. Press 1995) (highlighting use of monuments to forge national
identity); see also LADERMAN, supra note 19, at 124 (noting, "In order to alleviate the
anxieties and grief of northern citizens, religious and political leaders and much of the
popular media imaginatively transformed the destruction of life into something heroic;
their message inevitably returned to the sacred life of the nation and the promise of a
'good death' in the service of the Union.").
28. Despite emphasis on separation of Union and Confederate forces in burial,
National Park Service guides at the Antietam national historic site acknowledged the
likelihood that unidentified mortal remains of Confederate troops were buried
alongside those of Union dead at Antietam and other national cemeteries. Cf. the
author's July 22, 2004 Antietam battlefield tour with National Park Service guide
Brian Baracz.
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specifically focused on the property of the Confederacy's
commander.29 Here, the federal government exercised its eminent
domain power over Lee's property to situate, or "plant," its dead
literally in his backyard. The federal government insisted that it was
not obliged to pay just compensation for Lee's land, but the Supreme
Court, in U.S. v. Lee, held otherwise.
Another example is Andersonville, Georgia, where the U.S.
established a national cemetery in the Civil War's aftermath
proximate to the site of the Confederacy's largest prisoner of war
camp. As with Arlington, dead bodies were used here to assert the
nation's interests and presence, thereby reconfiguring the site's
meaning.30 As such, the rise of the U.S. national cemetery in the Civil
War era signaled a burgeoning federal interest in using the burial of
the dead to serve particular national interests and needs. With this
burgeoning interest came increased potential for disruption of the
interests and needs of the individual deceased and their kin, as
subsequent examples will make clear.

29. See, e.g., LADERMAN, supra note 19, at 120, observing:
After the war the government assumed responsibility for the burial of all
Union soldiers who died during the battles, making sure that as many of
them as possible were interred in federally owned national cemeteries. In the
name of democracy, liberty, and Christian morality, identifying the remains
of individual soldiers and ordering them in an accessible space became
national imperatives; the lifeless bodies of 'common' soldiers would find a
place in the revived social body. Land was appropriated - much of it
southern - and permanent grave markers began to be installed...
Id.
30. Resonating with this notion of rewriting a site's iconography through the use of
the dead, several recent news stories out of Russia underscore the significance of
burial of the dead to claims of history. When one of President Putin's aides suggested
that Lenin be removed from his mausoleum in Red Square and buried alongside his
mother in St. Petersburg, reactions were heated, with Communist Party leaders
accusing Putin's aides of "not know[ing] the country's history and stretch[ing] out their
dirty hands and muddy ideas to the national necropolis." C.J. Chivers, With Lenin's
Ideas Dead, Russia Weighs What to do with Body, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, at Al. By
contrast, Democratic Union party leaders concurred with the suggestion, declaring, "It
is time to get rid of this horrible mummy ...I would not care even if he were thrown
on a garbage heap." Id.; see also Steven Lee Myers, We Will Rebury You: For a New
Russia, New Relics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at Week in Review (observing, "Russia is
rewriting its history, one corpse at a time. The latest chapter involved a funeral with
full military honors inside the sacred Donskoi Monastery here on Monday, attended by
the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Aleksy II, and some of the
country's leading politicians. The body of Gen. Anton Denikin, a czarist commander of
the losing side in the Russian Civil War, was laid to rest again, this time in his
motherland, 58 years after he died in the United States.").

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
2.

[Vol. 58:1

Post-World War I establishment of U.S. military
cemeteries overseas

With a dozen U.S. national cemeteries founded in the Civil War
era, World War I's aftermath brought a concerted effort to assert the
United States' new global prominence through the overseas
settlement, or "patriation," of U.S. military dead, principally in
Europe. Among other things, I argue, the United States' campaign to
persuade surviving kin to allow for the burial of U.S. military dead in
Europe represented an attempt on the part of this emerging power to
colonize Europe with its dead as an assertion of its new global
identity.31
While it was, of course, more convenient and arguably cheaper to
leave the U.S. dead behind in Europe than to repatriate them home,
the efforts made to persuade surviving families to leave their loved
ones in Europe suggests the U.S. had more at stake than mere
convenience. The U.S. government bestowed gold stars on mothers
(and only on mothers; indeed, principally on birth mothers, where
adopted mothers were recognized only if the death of the birth
mother was established)32 willing to make the "ultimate sacrifice" of
their sons' bodies to this nationalist effort.33 When first introduced in
31. See PIEHLER, supra note 27, at 96 ("[S]upporters of military cemeteries in
France emphasized the continued service the war dead could perform for their country
and for Western civilization. Each individual soldier's grave would serve as an
enduring monument to the cause of freedom for which they bled and died. By not
scattering the war dead across the United States, by leaving them massed together in
France, their valiant role in history would not be forgotten or obscured.").
32. Foreshadowing my critique of the federal government's privileging of certain
understandings of the "family" through use of constrained definitions of terms in U.S.
national cemeteries, see Part I.A.4. infra, the American Gold Star Mothers, Inc.,
defines its membership in narrow terms, principally limited to birth mothers:
Natural Mothers, who are citizens of the United States of America or of the
Territorial and Insular Possessions of the United States of America, whose
sons and daughters served and died in [the] line of duty in the Armed Forces
of the United States of America or its Allies, or died as a result of injuries
sustained in such service, are eligible for membership in American Gold Star
Mothers, Inc.
American Gold Star Mothers, Inc., at http://www.goldstarmoms.com/agsm/WhoWeAre/
History/History.htm. The Gold Star Mothers admit adoptive mothers as members only
where they have "reared the child from the age of five years [and where the] natural
mother is deceased." Id. Thus, according to Gold Star Mothers, a child can only have
one mother, or certainly only one mother who is honored for her loss.
33. The Gold Star appellation, and its associated rhetoric, has persisted, where a
recent New Yorker piece profiling the parents of a soldier killed in Iraq referred to the
mother as using this nomenclature. Calvin Trillin, Lost Son, THE NEW YORKER, Mar.
14, 2005, at 64. Under the heading, "Who Are We?," the official website of the
American Gold Star Mothers today notes:
We Are Mothers
The membership of American Gold Star Mothers, Inc. is composed of
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the 1920s, gold stars were bestowed upon birth mothers willing to
have their sons' remains buried in overseas cemeteries.34 The U.S.
government paid first-class, round-trip cabin fare to Europe for visits
by gold star mothers to their sons' burial sites.35
In the post-World War I period, seventy percent of surviving
families chose not to have their loved ones' remains patriated
overseas, instead requesting that the remains be repatriated for
burial in the U.S.36 Through this resistance to the gold star rhetoric,
the survivors asserted agency over the disposition and ultimate
"naming" of their dead.37
World War II's aftermath saw much the same settlement of dead
American soldiers' remains in Europe, such that the U.S. now

American Mothers who lost a son or daughter during World War I, World
War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, Beirut, Grenada, Panama, the
Persian Gulf, Somalia, Bosnia, Saudi Arabia, all Strategic Areas, or while in
service to our country....
The organization was founded nationally shortly after the First World
War by Mrs. Grace Darling Seibold, Washington, DC, for the purpose of
perpetuating the ideals of Americanism for which their children had so
gallantly fought and died....
American Gold Star Mothers, Inc., Who are the American Gold Star Mothers?, at
http://www.goldstarmoms.com/who.htm.
34. G. Kurt Piehler, The War Dead and the Gold Star: American Commemoration
of the First World War, in COMMEMORATIONS: THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
169, 173 (John R. Gillis ed., 1994).
35. Id. at 177.
36. Id. at 173.
37. Again, see Abrams' work on agency, supra note 17.
As previously noted, some northern families during the Civil War likewise
refused to have their loved ones' remains interred "abroad," i.e., in the South, but,
instead, made the arduous journey to where their son or husband had fallen to carry
the body home. With significant parallels to the post-world war refusal to allow loved
ones' remains to remain in Europe, Laderman notes of northern families during the
Civil War:
In spite of government efforts to exploit the ideological symbolism of the war
dead, many northern families simply refused to sacrifice their loved one's
soul and body to the state. The retrieval of the corpse was a heartfelt,
compelling matter for civilians who did not believe that such abstractions as
national martyrdom or blood baptism legitimated abandonment of the
remains of a father, husband, brother, or son. Stillman Wightman, who made
the long, formidable journey to find the remains of his son and transfer them
home, articulated the sentiments of many northerners who insisted on
controlling the fate of their dead: 'I came away feeling that all my care and
toil was nothing compared with the satisfaction of knowing that his remains
had been taken up from a grave in an enemy's land, and had been safely
transported to the land of his birth, and peacefully buried in our family
cemetery.'
LADERMAN, supra note 19, at 152.
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maintains twenty-four U.S. national cemeteries overseas,38 the vast
majority of which are located in Europe. Public sentiment opposed
the establishment of U.S. national cemeteries in Asia as too great a
distance both physically and culturally. As one historian noted, "[t]he
American Legion echoed [public] sentiments, insisting that ... their
distance from 'civilization' ruled them out as the final resting places
for fallen American servicemen."39 I examine this difference in
treatment of U.S. soldiers' remains in Europe and Asia in the section
that follows.
3.

Ongoing efforts to repatriate U.S. soldiers' remains from
Korea and Vietnam

With this patriation, or "population," of Europe with American
military dead in mind, it is particularly striking to note the
extraordinary lengths to which the United States has gone to recover
remains of U.S. soldiers following war in Korea and Vietnam.40
Indeed, efforts are still ongoing nearly fifty years after the end of the
Korean conflict to bring the dead home. Caroline Alexander recently
reported for The New Yorker on the "epic scale" of the U.S.' efforts to
repatriate soldiers' mortal remains from Asia, noting, with 110
remains identified each year, . . . barring fresh losses in new arenas
of conflict, it will take the United States government four hundred
and nine years to make good its pledge" to bury its dead at home.41
While ambivalence about the war and eventual defeat in
Vietnam are central reasons for the U.S. decision not to patriate its
soldiers' mortal remains there,42 there is also a level at which the
38. American Battle Monuments Commission, supra note 16. The twenty-four
overseas U.S. national cemeteries are located in Belgium, England, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Panama, the Philippines, and Tunisia. Id.
There are approximately 124,917 U.S. war dead interred in these cemeteries. Id. Of
these, 30,922 relate to World War I, 93,245 to World War II, and 750 to the Mexican.
American War. Id. Perpetual title to the land underlying the cemeteries was granted
to the United States by the various host countries, without either fee or taxation. See
American Battle Monuments Commission, at http://www.abmc.gov/abmcl4l.htm
(recounting, "Like World War I cemeteries, the use of the World War II sites as
permanent military burial grounds was granted in perpetuity by each host country
free of charge or taxation. Except in the Philippines, burial in these cemeteries is
limited by agreements with the host country to members of the U.S. Armed Forces
who died overseas during the war. American civilian technicians, Red Cross workers
and entertainers serving the military were treated as members of the Armed Forces
insofar as burial entitlement was concerned.").
39. PIEHLER, supra note 27, at 130.
40.

See, e.g., Caroline Alexander, Across the River Styx, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 25,

2004, at 44.
41. Id. at 46.
42. As Piehler aptly concludes:
The [U.S.] government's decision to return all the American war dead from

20051

KEEP YOUR HANDS OFFMY (DEAD)BODY

differential treatment of soldiers' remains between Europe and Asia
must be understood through the lens of race difference, with an
understanding that the distinct racial identity of the Korean and
Vietnamese populations, and perception of them as "other," impacted
the decision whether to allow U.S. soldiers remains to rest in Asia or
bring them home. In some ways, it is a question of whether burial
overseas is an extension of burial at home or not, and the
extraordinary resources committed to repatriating remains from
Korea and Vietnam make clear the discomfort, official and otherwise,
with leaving those remains abroad.
4.

Federal authority to regulate the "family" in burial in
U.S. national cemeteries

Not only were U.S. cemeteries here and abroad used to assert a
particular understanding of the "nation," but they were also used to
privilege particular understandings of the "family" and devalue
others, through imposition of significant limitations on which family
members could be buried alongside U.S. service members in U.S.
national cemeteries.
Looking first to overseas U.S. national cemeteries, there U.S.
service members have been, and continue to be, buried alone, with no
family members authorized to be interred alongside them.43 The
family is thus marginalized most acutely in this context. It is also in
this context that the dead soldiers are most overtly identified in
national and/or nationalist terms.
With regard to domestic U.S. national cemeteries, federal
cemetery administrators determine which Armed Forces members
and veterans may be buried within their gates and which of their
family members may be buried alongside them.44 As such, federal
officials act as gatekeepers in death with regard to issues of both
patriotism and family, where "family" is defined almost exclusively in
terms of dependency. For example, the national cemetery family
burial guidelines specify that:

Vietnam reflected, at best, the ambivalence the government and the public
felt toward this Asian conflict. Defeat only heightened the need to return all
the fallen service personnel to their homeland and to ensure that they rested
among their friends.
PIEHLER, supra note 27, at 168.
43. Id. at 168-78.
44. See Department of Veterans Affairs National Cemetery Administration,
Persons Eligible for Burial in a VA National Cemetery, available at
http://www.cem.va.gov/eligible.htm (setting forth eligibility criteria for family member
burial alongside U.S. service members).
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. Only dependent spouses may be buried alongside their
service member spouses. Remarried widows who died before
2000 and divorced spouses are specifically barred.
. Only dependent children, and not those who have reached
the age of majority, may be buried with their parent(s).45
The cemetery regulations go on to make clear that dependent
children can include children who have reached the age of majority
only so long as they: (1) are enrolled full-time in post-secondary
education; or (2) are both disabled and unmarried.46 Dependency
thus becomes a proxy for attachment and loyalty, even patriotism,
given the context of national cemetery burial, while independence, as

45. See id. First priority for burial in a Department of Veterans Affairs cemetery is
extended to:
a. Veterans and Members of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marine Corps, Coast Guard)
(1) Any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who dies on
active duty.
(2) Any veteran who was discharged under conditions other than
dishonorable.

Id.
In addition to active members and veterans, the Department's guidelines provide for
the interment of military spouses and dependent children as follows:
g. Spouses and Dependents
(1) The spouse or surviving spouse of an eligible veteran is eligible for
interment in a national cemetery even if that veteran is not buried or
memorialized in a national cemetery. In addition, the spouse or surviving
spouse of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States whose remains
are unavailable for burial is also eligible for burial.
(2) The surviving spouse of an eligible veteran who had a subsequent
remarriage to a non-veteran and whose death occurred on or after January 1,
2000, is eligible for burial in a national cemetery, based on his or her
marriage to the eligible veteran.
(3) The minor children of an eligible veteran. For purpose of burial in a
national cemetery, a minor child is a child who is unmarried and:
(a) Who is under 21 years of age; or,
(b) Who is under 23 years of age and pursuing a full-time course of
instruction at an approved educational institution.
(4) The unmarried adult child of an eligible veteran. For purpose of burial
in a national cemetery, an unmarried adult child is:
Of any age but became permanently physically or mentally disabled and
incapable of self-support before reaching 21 years of age, or before reaching
23 years of age if pursuing a full-time course of instruction at an approved
educational institution. Proper supporting documentation must be provided.

Id.
Lastly, these guidelines have a catch-all category encompassing "such other
persons or classes of persons as designated by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (38
U.S.C. § 2402(6)), or the Secretary of Defense (Pub. L. 95-202, § 401, and 38 CFR §
3.7(x))." Id.

46. Id.
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in reaching adulthood or graduating from college,47 connotes a lack of
attachment or loyalty, barring the individual from the honor (and
significant cost-saving) of national cemetery burial.48 In this way,
dependence shapes family membership, even national citizenship, in
death, at both a symbolic and actual level.
Recently, controversy erupted over a Defense Department
regulation providing that, in the absence of a dead soldier's specific
directive to the contrary, the Department will repatriate the soldier's
mortal remains to the older of his or her estranged parents, more
often than not the father.49 In first hearing of this departmental
regulation, I thought of Reed v. Reed (1971) and Justice Ginsburg's
successful challenge to Idaho's presumption that, as between the
competing claims of the surviving mother and father to serve as
administrator of their deceased son's estate, the law would prefer the
male. While the Defense Department's regulation is not explicitly
sex-based as was the presumption at issue in Reed, it is nevertheless
striking in its potential for disparate effects by sex. The regulation is
currently under review by the Department, following widespread
criticism in the press in a case involving a divorced mother's
challenge to the older parent presumption advantaging her former
spouse.
Returning then to the question of federal regulation of burial in
U.S. national cemeteries, others who may be eligible for burial there
are defined as exactly that, "others." The Department of Veterans
Affairs regulations specify that "such other persons or classes of
persons as designated by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs or
Secretary of Defense may be buried in a national cemetery."5o This
last provision empowers the Secretaries with broad discretion to
47. The Department of Veterans Affairs specifically excludes the following classes
of individuals from burial in U.S. national cemeteries:
a. Former Spouses
A former spouse of an eligible individual whose marriage to that individual
has been terminated by annulment or divorce, if not otherwise eligible.
b. Other Family Members
Family members of an eligible person except those defined as eligible in
Section III, paragraph g.
Id.
48. Here, I am reminded of Antigone and the struggle between Antigone and Creon
over how to dispose of Polyneices' body. While Antigone argues that all deserve a
burial, Creon proclaims that only those who have brought honor to the state should be
buried in its soil. Sophocles, Antigone; see also Cynthia Patterson, The Polis and the
Corpse: the Regulation of Burial in DemocraticAthens, SCHRIFTEN DES HISTORISCHEN
KOLLEGS KOLLOQUIEN 49, at 102-07.
49. Army
Reg.
638-2,
at
http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/l_series_
collection l.html. See also Dean E. Murphy & Carolyn Marshall, Family Feuds Over
Soldier's Remains, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2005, at A13.
50. Dep't of Veterans Affairs National Cemetery Administration, supra note 44.
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determine who is in and who is out in matters of death, again
underscoring the power of U.S. national cemetery burial policies to
shape understandings of honor and identity in death in service of
national interests.
5.

The all-consuming patriotism of the Tomb of the
Unknowns

Yet another example of the federal government's use of dead
bodies to construct an ideology of the nation and its citizenry, and
encourage self-sacrifice in service thereof, is the veneration of the
Tomb of the Unknowns-a post World War I-era memorial erected at
Arlington National Cemetery and later supplemented with
unidentified remains from soldiers who died in World War II, the
Korean conflict, and the Vietnam War. The Tomb of the Unknowns,
with its twenty-four hour honor guard and austere ritual, is an
important emblem of our civic religion, celebrating the nation and
self-sacrifice for the state above all other attachments in death.51
Indeed, all identifiers, including name, gender, race, ethnicity, and
religion, are obliterated in shaping the model U.S. citizen in death,
the Unknown Soldier. Given the highly contested nature of our
involvement in Vietnam, it may be unsurprising, albeit striking, to
learn that the only set of remains to be removed from the Tomb of the
Unknowns were those of the Vietnam-era soldier, who, following
DNA identification, was disinterred and reburied outside Arlington.52
To better understand the all-consuming patriotism of the Tomb
of the Unknowns, Benedict Anderson, in Imagined Communities,
invites the following thought-experiment, "To feel the force of this
modernity one has only to imagine the general reaction to the busybody who 'discovered' the Unknown Soldier's name or insisted on
filling the cenotaph with some real bones. Sacrilege of a strange,
contemporary kind!"53 In this light, the 1998 disinterment from the
Tomb of the remains of the newly identified Vietnam-era veteran
"reads" as a demotion or dishonoring.54
Returning to his earlier theme of nationalism replacing religion
as the principal tool for organizing human experience, Anderson
asserts that tombs of the unknown soldier, wherever found, fulfill a
51. The Tomb reads, "Here Rests in Honored Glory An American Soldier Known
Visitor
Information,
at
Arlington
National
Cemetery,
But
to
God."
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.org/text/tomb-of the unknownstext.html.
52. The remains of the unknown soldier interred from the Vietnam War were later
identified as those of Lt. Michael Joseph Blassie and were removed and individually
reinterred outside of Arlington National Cemetery in 1998. Arlington National
Cemetery, http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/vietnam.htm.
53. ANDERSON, supra note 20, at 9.
54. See supra note 52.
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religiously significant symbolic role, addressing the human need to
make sense of loss, especially loss of life in war. According to
Anderson, following the eclipse of religion as the dominant mode of
human understanding:
What then was required was a secular transformation of
fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning. As we shall
see, few things were (are) better suited to this end than an idea
of nation.... It is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into
destiny. With Debray we might say, "Yes, it is quite accidental
that I am born French; but after all, France is eternal."55
Applying Anderson's analysis to the U.S.' particular iteration of this
phenomenon, the Unknown Soldier is readily recognized as our civic
Christ, where the ritualized observation of the twenty-four hour
honor guard constitutes our civic communion, or apotheosis, as a
people.
The Vietnam Veterans' Memorial contrasts sharply with the
symbolism of the Tomb, where its vast list of names invites
individual commemoration rather than universal, identity-eliding
salvation, as at the Tomb. As such, the Wall's manner of
commemoration in many ways reflects the highly individuated or
fragmented experience of the war itself. Borrowing a page from
Foucault, the Unknown Soldier exists only as an idea, where the
individual is rendered invisible through deification, while the
Vietnam Memorial pays tribute to the actual, individual dead, where
agreement on anything more could not be had and where survivors
regularly offer personalized remembrances, whether letters, flowers,
or photographs, quite at odds with the ritualized performance at the
Tomb.
6.

Erasure of the returning war dead: changing U.S. policy
on photo-journalistic access to the military dead

In reflecting on the all-consuming, identity-obliterating
patriotism of the Tomb of the Unknowns, I thought of the Bush
administrations' prohibition on the taking and dissemination of
photographs of the returning U.S. war dead from Iraq and
Afghanistan.56 The official embargo on photographing returning U.S.
war dead was introduced in early 1991 by President George H.W.
Bush during the Gulf War,57 and was reaffirmed by the present Bush

55. ANDERSON, supra note 20, at 11-12.
56. See Dan Baum, Two Soldiers: How the Dead Come Home, THE NEW YORKER,
Aug. 9, 2004, at 76 (providing detailed account of care given U.S. soldiers' mortal
remains and their repatriation from Iraq to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware).
57. Memorandum from Department of Defense on Public Affairs Guidance Operation Desert Storm Casualty and Mortuary Affairs (Feb. 6, 1991), cited in
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administration when it undertook military action in Afghanistan in
late 2001.58
While vastly different in substance from the rise of the U.S.
national cemetery, the embargo on photographing the returning war
dead reflects a parallel impulse toward use of the dead to promote a
particular understanding of the nation. Here, rather than
prominently displaying the honored dead, as in the national
cemeteries, the government has sought to render the dead invisible,
where they are an obvious source of embarrassment, contradicting
assertions of national strength and dominance.
By contrast with the current embargo, photojournalists
historically have had broad access to U.S. war dead pre-burial,
whether with the first war photography at the battle of Antietam in
1862,59 or with images of returning casualties from Vietnam on the
nightly news approximately a hundred years later. Images of the war
dead have not only been widely available, but highly honored.
Nevertheless, the current Bush administration's effort to embargo
photographs of the returning war dead is quite evidently an attempt
not to be undone by the same type of politically devastating images
that contributed to Johnson's demise,60 i.e., is motivated with an eye to
the so-called "Dover factor."61 As such, one of the central things that
the Bush administrations have done, or sought to do, through these
embargoes is to disrupt the public's right to know the costs of military
engagement, to end-run the Dover test.
While nothing in the embargo disrupts the surviving kin's
ultimate right of access to the deceased's body, I would argue that the
Defense Department's effort to render today's dead invisible has
complaint filed in Begleiter v. Dep't of Defense, 1:04CV01697 3 (filed Oct. 4, 2004).
58. Memorandum from Department of Defense on Public Affairs Guidance Casualty and Mortuary Affairs - Operation Enduring Freedom (Nov. 1, 2001), cited in
complaint filed in Begleiter v. Dep't of Defense, 1:04CV01697 17 (filed Oct. 4, 2004).
59. See LADERMAN, supra note 19, at 148 ("In October of 1862, a series of
photographs were exhibited in a New York City gallery owned and operated by
Matthew Brady, one of the most famous photographers of the period. Some of his
assistants, including Alexander Gardner... had traveled to the Antietam
battlefield after the Union victory a month earlier and had begun photographing
what they saw there - an area devastated by some of the worst fighting in the war.
According to William A. Frassanito, a historian of Civil War photography, the
photographers' access to the newly dead on the field was unprecedented: 'Antietam
was the first battlefield in American history to be covered by cameramen before the
dead had been buried."').
60. One can only imagine that Johnson, like Bush, would have liked to embargo
photographs of the returning war dead, in the face of protestors chanting, "Hey, hey
LBJ, How many kids did you kill today?"
61. The "Dover factor" refers to the degree to which an administration takes into
account the impact of the returning war dead on public support for military action in
contemplating potential military engagement.
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compelling personhood consequences, where the embargo connotes a
failure, even a refusal, to publicly recognize the deceased's, and his or
her kin's, sacrifice. While on the one hand, it is a question of whether
the government is seeking to minimize public awareness of, and
responsibility for, these deaths, on another, it is a question for
whether the soldier and his or her kin have been acknowledged, or
witnessed, at the most basic level, for their loss to self and
personhood. In that regard, the photography embargo commits a
personhood harm without any valid countervailing state interest.62
Returning to the details of the photography embargo, we find
that, despite the 2001 Defense Department guidance against the
taking and dissemination of photographs, U.S. military photos of
caskets bearing returning U.S. war dead were obtained by Russell
Kick in April 2004 under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
and were promptly displayed on Kick's website.63 Kick's FOIA
request had originally been denied and then granted on appeal, with
the U.S. Air Force forwarding 288 of its photos to Kick. The photos
were promptly disseminated from Kick's website to the mainstream
press and beyond.64

62. The official reason articulated by the Defense Department for its photography
ban is the privacy interests of the survivors. See Begleiter v. Dep't of Defense,
1:04CV01697 (complaint filed Oct. 4, 2004).
63. See
The
Memory
Hole,
Photos
of
Military
Coffins,
at
http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/coffin-photos/dover.
64. See Amy Harmon, New Technology Loosens Controls Over Images of War, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 2004, at A12 (noting subsequent publication of photos from Kick's
website by mainstream news organizations).
Where photos of the returning U.S. war dead were ultimately disseminated
over the web, so too were photos of Iraqi dead, though the latter were not nearly as
honorably displayed. Quite to the contrary, photos of dismembered and otherwise
dishonored Iraqi dead circulate on the internet, such as one photograph entitled,
"Cooked Iraqi," at http://www.nowthatsfuckedup.comlbbs/ftopicl9O94-0-asc-0.html.
My interest in exploring tensions surrounding repatriation and burial of the
dead led me to laws and customs of war, as well as international conventions on the
protection of cultural property, embodying international norms obligating statesparties to preserve the enemy dead for subsequent repatriation and desist from
harming enemy cultural property in war, including cemeteries and other burial sites.
International sources of law regarding obligations to preserve and protect the enemy
dead during armed conflict include the Lieber Code of 1863 (relied on during the
American Civil War), 1899 Hague Convention, 1907 Hague Convention, 1929 Geneva
Convention, and, most importantly, the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Article 15 of the
first 1949 Convention provides, inter alia, "At all times, and particularly after an
engagement, Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible measures to
search for and collect the wounded and sick, to protect them against pillage and illtreatment, to ensure their adequate care, and to search for the dead and prevent their
being despoiled."
International sources of law regarding states-parties' obligations to protect the
enemy's cultural property, such as cemeteries and other burial grounds, include the
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The very same week that Kick obtained access to the military's
photos of the returning war dead, another civilian, Tami Silicio, who
had been working for a Defense Department contractor, Maytag
Aircraft, at the Kuwait International Airport, was summarily
discharged from her job for violating Department policy against the
taking and dissemination of photos of the returning war dead.65
According to Silicio, she had been emotionally moved one evening
while assisting with the shipment home of twenty-two dead U.S.
soldiers to take a photo of the cargo hold of the plane showing U.S.
flag-draped caskets, approximately three wide and seven deep.66 She
emailed a friend after work, attaching her photo and stating that
they had "sent home 22" that day.67 Her friend in turn forwarded the
photo to the Seattle Times, which published Silicio's photo on the
front page of its Sunday, April 18, 2004 edition.68 Silicio was
reprimanded by Maytag for the photo's publication and then fired
two days later, along with her husband (who ostensibly had not
played a role in the photo's taking or dissemination) when word
"came down from the Pentagon."69
Lieber Code, the Brussels Declaration of 1874, the 1899 Hague Convention, the 1907
Hague Convention, and the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.
65. Tami Silicio's Official Website, http://www.tamisilicio.net. See Harmon, supra
note 64, at A12.
66. Tami Silicio's Official Website, supra note 65.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. Silicio notes that she was motivated to take the photograph in part because
she had lost a son at the age of 19 and was moved by the losses of these men and
women of approximately the same age and by their parents' grief. Id; see Hal Bernton,
The Somber Task of Honoring the Fallen, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004
(recounting same background to Silicio's photo and reporting that "[slince the 1991
Gulf War, photographs of coffins as they return to the United States have been tightly
restricted. And few such photographs have been published during the conflict in
Iraq."); Hal Bernton, Woman Loses Her Job Over Coffins Photo, THE SEATTLE TIMES,
Apr. 22, 2004 (recounting Silicio's firing in aftermath of April 18, 2004 publication of
coffin photo); see also Harmon, supra note 64 (noting new phenomenon of private
citizens' ability to take and disseminate photographs of military operations, where "the
traditional establishment - the military, the government, the mainstream media appears to be losing control of the images of war," and citing military historians in
observing that "digital technology is forcing a major shift in the expectation of what
can be kept private, and it may ultimately hold everyone more accountable for their
actions.").
Commenting on Silicio's firing, the New York Times declared in an editorial:
Since 1991, the Defense Department has prohibited taking photographs of
the coffins of members of the armed services while they are being
transported back to the United States. The reverent portrait Ms. Silicio
produced demonstrates how irrational that policy is. The theory seems to be
that the pictures are intrusive, or possibly hurtful, to bereaved families. But
it seems far more likely that the Pentagon is concerned about the impact
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Then, in October 2004, University of Delaware School of
Communications Professor Ralph Begleiter and the National
Security Archives sued the Defense Department under FOIA,
challenging its embargo on photographs of the returning U.S. war
dead.70 The government responded by releasing more than 700
military photos of returning coffins from Afghanistan and Iraq
between 2001 and 2004.71 Subsequent to this release, however, the
Defense Department declared that the release of photos did not
signify a "lifting of the ban on media coverage of returning
casualties," which, according to a Department spokesperson, was
intended to "ensure privacy and respect is given to the families who
have lost their loved ones."72 The Department continues to maintain
its policy guidance and to assert its concern for the privacy interests
of the survivors.
In a similar fashion, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency ("FEMA") sought to prohibit photographs of the dead
following the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina.73 Cable
News Network ("CNN") challenged the FEMA ban immediately upon
its announcement, and on September 9, U.S. District Court Judge
Keith Ellison in Houston convened a hearing at which attorneys for
the United States indicated that FEMA would no longer attempt to
ban photography of Katrina's dead.74 A parallel impulse here by the
that photos of large numbers of flag-draped coffins may have on the
American public's attitude toward the war.
That certainly underestimates the fortitude of average citizens, who are
able to accept the cost of war whenever they are confident that the cause is
right. American men and women are currently suffering danger, death and
injury every day in Iraq.
Editorial, The Real War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2004, at A22. The Times then concluded,
"[T]he least those of us back home can do is to bear witness to the sacrifice of the real
soldiers..." Id. This then dovetails with my concern for the personhood harm
committed by the embargo.
70. Begleiter v. Dep't of Defense, 1:04CV01697 3 (complaint filed Oct. 4, 2004).
71. Ann Scott Tyson, Hundreds of Photos of Caskets Released, WASH. POST, Apr.
29, 2005, at A8.
72. Id.
73. Jere Longman & Stewell Chan, The Storm: Flooding Recedes in New Orleans,
U.S. Inquiry is Set, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at Al (reporting, "[t]he Federal
Emergency Management Agency said on Tuesday that it did not want news
photographers to take pictures of the dead as they were recovered in New Orleans.
FEMA rejected requests from journalists to accompany rescue boats. An agency
spokeswoman said that 'the recovery of the victims is being treated with dignity and
the utmost respect."').
74. CNN, U.S. Won't Ban Media from New Orleans Searches: CNN Filed Suit for
Right to Cover Search for Bodies of Katrina Victims, Sept. 11, 2005, at
http://www.cnn.com/2005[LAW/09/10/katrina.media/index.html;
see Transcript of
Court Proceedings for CNN v. Michael Brown, Sept. 11, 2005, at http://www.cnn.com/
2005/LAW/09/11/katrina.mediaaccess.transcript/index.html.
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federal government to control the significations of the dead body by
7
simply rendering it unseen. 5
B. Disposition of the unclaimed dead
My research on the disposition of the military dead led me to
consider what happens with the bodies of "unclaimed" dead, i.e., nonservice members who die without identifiable next of kin.76 The
answer is that, in many jurisdictions, unclaimed dead bodies become
the property of the state and the bodies are transferred to statebased medical schools to serve as cadavers for dissection and
anatomy training.77 Indeed, twenty percent of cadavers used for
The severe disruption of personhood interests at stake in the failed response to
Katrina's dead is further explored in this article's Epilogue.
75. See Dana Milbank, Curtains Orderedfor Media Coverage of Returning Coffins,
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2003, at A23, noting:
Since the end of the Vietnam War, presidents have worried that their
military actions would lose support once the public glimpsed the remains of
U.S. soldiers arriving at air bases in flag-draped caskets.
To this problem, the Bush administration has found a simple solution: It
has ended the public dissemination of such images by banning news coverage
and photography of dead soldiers' homecomings on all military bases.
As Milbank notes:
The Pentagon has previously acknowledged the effect on public opinion of
the grim tableau of caskets being carried from transport planes to hangars
or hearses. In 1999, the then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army
Gen. Henry H. Shelton, said a decision to use military force is based in part
on whether it will pass "the Dover test," as the public reacts to fatalities.
Id. At the time of the Persian Gulf War under Bush I,
[Tihe Pentagon said there would be no more media coverage of coffins
returning to Dover, the main arrival point; a year earlier, Bush was angered
when television networks showed him giving a news briefing on a split
screen with caskets arriving.
Id. See also Bill Carter, Pentagon Ban on Pictures of Dead Troops is Broken, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2004, at A14.
76. Last year's battle over Terri Schiavo's body, both living and dead, is very much
the converse of the experience of the unclaimed dead. There, Schiavo's parents and the
state of Florida did battle with Schiavo's husband to control the disposition of her body
in both life and death. In each, Schiavo's husband prevailed, where Schiavo was
ultimately cremated according to his, and allegedly her, preference, and where, though
buried in Florida as Schiavo's parents wished (rather than in Pennsylvania, as
Schiavo's husband had originally suggested), Schiavo's husband erected a headstone
stating the date that Schiavo "left this world" as the date she entered into a
permanent vegetative state, and claiming that he "had kept his promise." See Cara
Buckley, et al., Return to normalcy may prove difficult for Schiavos, Schindlers, THE
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 3, 2005.
In another case of significant media attention, Andrea Yates and her exhusband agreed as a term of their divorce settlement that Ms. Yates will have the
right to be buried alongside her children, who she was convicted of drowning. Divorce
Finalizedfor Mother Who Killed Her Children, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2005, at Al.
77. In providing for the transfer of unclaimed dead bodies to medical schools,
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anatomical dissection in U.S. and Canadian medical schools today
are unclaimed dead bodies acquired from state authorities in this
manner.7 8 This practice of transferring the unclaimed dead for
medical dissection is striking indeed when understood in the context
of the significant race and class disparities that result,79 where non-

states within the United States follow the model of the English Anatomy Act of 1832:
which was promulgated to provide medical schools with a steady supply of
cadavers for educational purposes. Under the 1832 Act, unclaimed corpses
and paupers' corpses were donated to medical schools, thereby granting the
schools a property interest in such cadavers. The Act served two main state
purposes: (1) it relieved the state of the burden of determining the cadaver's
religious preferences and of paying for a burial; and (2) it allowed the state to
censure grave robbing by increasing the legal supply of corpses to the
schools. Only when no family appeared to claim the corpse and pay for its
burial did the Act step in to create such an interest in the medical school. As
with abandoned property, the finder of the object - here the state as the
medical school's agent - could then take legal possession of the unclaimed or
pauper's corpse.
Melissa A.W. Stickney, Note, Property Interests in Cadaverous Organs: Changes to
Ohio Anatomical Gift Law and the Erosion of Family Rights, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 37, 41
(2002). Within the United States, the bodies of those deceased due to suicide were
likewise subjected to medical dissection. See LADERMAN, supra note 19, at 19-21.
I've included as Appendix A to this Article a compendium of state laws
providing for the disposition of the unclaimed dead, with many providing for transfer
to medical schools for use as cadavers for dissection and anatomy training.
78. Neela Dasgupta, Unclaimed Bodies at the Anatomy Table, 291 JAMA 122
(2004). This commentator notes, "[p]rocuring cadavers from willing donors has never
been easy, however; accounts of early medical instruction dwell on the prisons, grave
robberies, and pauper murders that often supplied early American anatomy labs." Id.
Continuing, the author recounts, "[a]s stories of grave robbing circulated in the 1800s,
U.S. states responded with specific anatomy acts to prohibit the use of bodies thus
acquired. However, medical schools soon faced cadaver shortages, leading some states
to introduce new acts specifically permitting the use of unclaimed bodies for medical
school dissection." Id.
In surveying states' practices with regard to use of the unclaimed dead, this
author notes that New York's requirement that counties bury their unclaimed dead
has led to a shortage of cadavers for local medical schools, including Columbia
University, while,
some states, including Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Texas, automatically
turn over unclaimed bodies to legislatively established state anatomy boards,
whose sole objective is to support medical education and services ....

In

2002, 40% of bodies used for study in Maryland were unclaimed bodies,
individuals who died in a hospital and were not claimed by any friend or
relative for 72 hours.
Id. Ultimately, this article concludes, "[s]tudies evaluating the methods and efficacy of
donor solicitation programs could reveal superior approaches and, ultimately, reduce
both cadaver shortages and states' reliance on unclaimed bodies to fill the void in the
anatomy laboratory." Id.
79. My critique here is informed by the critical race theory work of my colleague
Darren Hutchinson, among others, which centers questions of race in its analysis and
underscores the multidimensionality of racial identity. See, e.g., Darren Lenard
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whites and the poor are disproportionately represented among the
unclaimed dead, subordinated in death as in life, as Michele Goodwin
and others have argued.80
It is intriguing to note, in this regard, that a number of states
use inmates to bury their unclaimed dead. In symbolic terms, this
practice employs one segment of the dispossessed in burying
another.81 New York City, for example, pays inmates 25 to 35 cents
per hour to bury its unclaimed dead,82 where inmates from the City's
jails bury the unclaimed dead in Potters Field on the Bronx's Hart
Island in the Long Island Sound.83 According to the New York City
Corrections Department, approximately 750,000 unclaimed dead
have been interred in Potter's Field to date.84 I noted with interest
that "inmates [in New York] appealed to the warden and offered to
build a monument to the unbefriended dead. This was accomplished
in 1948 when, in cooperation with the custodial staff, they erected a
30-foot high monument in the center of the burial site. On one side is
engraved a simple cross; on the other, the word 'Peace."'85 Here we
see powerfully demonstrated the human striving toward meaning in

Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and
Reform, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1455, 1479 (2002) ("Only a nuanced theory of race that
acknowledges both its constructed and material dimensions can lead to a realistic
account of racial injustice and, potentially, to the articulation of workable
antisubordination
theories.");
Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Identity Crisis:
"Intersectionality," "Multidimensionality,"and the Development of an Adequate Theory
of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285 (2001) (advocating recognition of
multidimensionality of identity, including race, class, ethnicity, sexual orientation,
etc.); Mar Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations,22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) (critiquing Critical Legal Studies from Critical
Race Theory perspective); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE
THEORY (Francisco Valdes ed., 2003).
80. See Michele Goodwin, Altruism's Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ
Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 376-80 (2004) (observing, "At the turn of
the nineteenth century, laws permitted only the dissection of condemned murderers.
Although states would later permit the dissection of unclaimed paupers, those most
commonly sacrificed were black and poor, as the exploitation of African-American
cemeteries continued into the twentieth century."); see generally MARY ROACH, STIFF:
THE CURIOUS LIVES OF HUMAN CADAVERS (2003).
81. On this theme, see Michele Goodwin, Deconstructing Legislative Consent Law:
Organ Taking, Racial Profiling & Distributive Justice, 6 VA. J. L & TECH. 2 (2001);
Marie-Andrfe Jacob, On Silencing and Slicing: Presumed Consent to Post-Mortem
Organ "Donation"in Diversified Societies, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 239 (2003). I
thank my colleague Darren Hutchinson for the citation to the first source.
82. N.Y.C. Department of Correction, City Cemetery Hart Island (Potter's Field),
at http://www.correctionhistory.org/html/chronicl/nycdoc/html/hart.html (last visited
July 27, 2005).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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death, in the face
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C. Disposition of the incarcerateddead, including the executed
In thinking about the potential for tension among national,
racial, ethnic, religious, family, and personhood interests in disposing
of, and assigning identity to, the dead, I wanted to learn what
happens with the bodies of those who die while incarcerated,
particularly those executed by the state or federal government. I
wanted to know whether the bodies are returned to the families or
estates of the deceased, or whether the bodies are retained by the
government as further punishment, or retribution, for the criminal
acts(s), or, in a more utilitarian light, for use in research or medicine.
As with Parts A and B, these are questions not only of who gets to
control the disposition of the dead, but of who gets to control the
assignment of identity in death.
What I learned is that, in many states, the body of the
incarcerated dead, whether executed or otherwise, is returned to the
individual designated by the deceased to oversee his or her memorial,
if any, and final disposition.86 This designee may be next of kin,
conventionally understood, but need not be. So far, so good, I
thought, in terms of concern for the deceased's personhood and
agency interests.
Nevertheless, I found that treatment of the decedent's body and
the degree of adherence paid to the decedent's designation for
disposition at death vary widely across states, where the deceased's
stated preferences and religious observances are often disregarded by
state prison administrators in the handling of the body.87 In Texas,
for example, the deceased's designee is charged with the cost of the
prison's mandatory embalming service despite the fact that
embalming is prohibited in certain religious traditions, including
Judaism and Islam, thereby disrupting those individuals' sense of
bodily and spiritual integrity.88 In still other states, including Florida
and Pennsylvania, a mandatory autopsy is performed by the state

86. Where the deceased has not designated someone to provide for his body
between death and burial, he may be transferred to the state medical examiner for use
in dissection by state-based medical schools, see Part 1B supra, or buried in the prison
cemetery. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Serving Life, With No Chance of Redemption, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, at Al (one of series of articles recounting experiences of "lifers" in
prison and featuring photograph of grave markers in Louisiana penitentiary cemetery,
"bear[ing] only the inmate's name and prison number.").
87. See Appendix B to this Article for a compendium of state and federal laws
governing disposition of the incarcerated dead, including those governing the executed
dead specifically.
88. See id.
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before the body is transferred to the deceased's designee, again in
contradiction of certain religious dictates, including those of Judaism
and Islam.89 In most states, the bodies of dead inmates who did not
designate recipients, or whose designees are deemed inappropriate
by the state prison administrator acting in his or her discretion, or
whose designees have pre-deceased them or are otherwise
unavailable, are retained by the state. The inmates' bodies may be
buried at public expense or transferred to state-based medical
schools for use in dissection and anatomy training, as noted in Part B
above.
New Jersey law is striking in the discretion with which it
charges state prison administrators to determine whether an
inmate's designation of an individual to oversee burial is contrary to
public policy.90 My concern here, of course, is for whether the body is
deemed unclaimed when the designation has been declared
inappropriate, and whether the body is then susceptible to transfer
for other uses, including medical dissection, a particularly pernicious
potential.
Lastly, with regard to the disposition of inmates' dead bodies
following execution for federal crimes, U.S. law instructs that the
administration of the death sentence, including the disposition of the
body of the executed, follow the practice of the state in which the
sentence was imposed.91 Thus, despite the federal nature of the
crime, state provisions regarding post-execution autopsy, embalming,
and discretion to depart from the deceased's stated preferences
govern.92
While researching laws governing the disposition of the federally
executed dead, I came across the infamous case of Eddie Slovik, the
World War II U.S. army deserter who was executed by the U.S.
military and buried in an unmarked cemetery in France along with
other so-called U.S. "infidels" (specifically, those convicted of rape
and murder). By contrast with the treatment of other U.S. military
dead, the federal government refused to repatriate his remains to his
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 3596 (2005) dictates:
When the sentence is to be implemented, the Attorney General shall release
the person sentenced to death to the custody of a United States marshal, who
shall supervise implementation of the sentence in the manner prescribed by
the law of the State in which the sentence is imposed. If the law of the State
does not provide for implementation of a sentence of death, the court shall
designate another State, the law of which does provide for the
implementation of a sentence of death, and the sentence shall be
implemented in the latter State in the manner prescribed by such law.

Id.
92.

Id.
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wife in the U.S., citing his unpatriotic activity.93 Here again, as with
the national cemetery burials generally, and the disposition of the
incarcerated dead specifically, we see the state's power to shape (or
constrain) ideas of honor and identity in death.
Foucault's work on the signification of the state's discipline and
punishment of the convicted is especially helpful in thinking about
the implications of methods for disposing of dead inmates,
particularly those who have been executed. As Foucault cogently
observed, "[T]he body is... directly involved in a political field;
power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark
it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform
ceremonies, to emit signs."94 Applying Foucault's framework to the
particular circumstances of the executed dead, not only does the
sovereign, whether state or federal government, exert control over
the body by exacting the "ultimate" penalty of death, but its control
reaches beyond death in dictating the manner of disposition of the
body, especially where the body is subject to further dishonoring, as
many would say is true in the case of involuntary dissection.
KEEP YOUR HANDS OFF MY (DEAD) BODY PART II: THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT'S EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY TO SHAPE IDEAS OF RACE
AND IDENTITY THROUGH THE REPATRIATION (OR NOT) OF MORTAL
REMAINS UNDER THE NATIVE AMERICAN GRAVE PROTECTION AND

REPATRIATION ACT

Not only does the federal government impose its authority to
shape understandings of honor and identity in death through
93. Ultimately, his wife's successor-in-interest was able to obtain his remains
following protracted legal proceedings, where the U.S. refused to contribute to the
costs of repatriating the body. See Zena Simmons, The Execution of Pvt. Eddie Slovik,
THE

DETROIT

NEWS,

available at

http://info.detnews.com/history/story/index.cfm?

id=103&category-people (last visited July 27, 2005). The article reports:
On Jan. 31, 1945, Hamtramck-born Eddie Slovik was executed by firing
squad near the village of Ste-Marie aux Mines for the crime of desertion.
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme allied commander, personally ordered
the execution during the closing days of World War II in order to deter other
potential deserters.
During World War II, 21,049 American military personnel were convicted
of desertion, 49 were sentenced to death, but only Pvt. Slovik paid the
ultimate price. In fact, he was the only American soldier to be executed for
desertion since the American Civil War.
He was buried in France, in a secret cemetery with 94 American soldiers
executed for the crimes of rape and murder.
Id.; see also William Bradford Huie, THE EXECUTION OF PRIVATE SLOVIK (1970).
94. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 25 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage

Books 2d ed. 1995).
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exertion of control over the disposition of the dead, as examined in
Part I above, but it imposes its will to shape ideas of race and
identity in death through its implementation of the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 ("NAGPRA").95
NAGPRA provides for the return from federal custody96 of Native
American mortal remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and
objects of cultural patrimony to lineal descendants and culturally
affiliated tribes.97 Our focus here is with the federal government's
95. Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048, 3048 (1990). For NAGPRA's legislative
history, see H.R. Rep. No. 101-877, at 1 (1990), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4367.
96. Entities required to comply with NAGPRA include federal agencies and all
museums receiving federal funding, other than the Smithsonian Institution, whose
repatriation obligations were established by the National Museum of the American
Indian Act of 1989, 20 USC § 80q (2005). The Smithsonian alone holds over 18,000 sets
of Native American mortal remains. See, e.g., id. § 80q(6), (7).
97. See NAGPRA, 25 USC § 3001-3013 (2000). According to the National Park
Service's published answers to Frequently Asked Questions ("FAQS"), an Indian tribe
for purposes of NAGPRA,
is any tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indians
that is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided
by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians .... The
Department of the Interior has interpreted the definition of "Indian tribe" as
applying to approximately 770 Indian tribes and Alaskan Native villages
that are recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
National Park Service, Department of the Interior, FAQS, at http://www.cr.nps.govl
nagpra/FAQ/INDEX.htm.
In response to public comment, the National Park Service amended its
implementing regulations for NAGPRA to make clear that those tribes recognized as
eligible for special benefits from the federal government were not necessarily limited
to those recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Instead, the official list of
recognized Indian tribes for NAGPRA purposes is maintained by the Secretary of the
Interior's Departmental Consulting Archaeologist. See Changes in Response to Public
Comment, NAGPRA Implementing Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 62133, 62136. Now, the
final regulation defining "Indian tribe" reads as follows:
Indian tribe means any tribe, band, nation, or other organized Indian group
or community of Indians ... which is recognized as eligible for the special
programs and services provided by the U.S. to Indians because of their
status as Indians. The Secretary will distribute a list of Indian tribes for the
purposes of carrying out this statute through the Departmental Consulting
Archaeologist.
43 C.F.R. sec. 10.2(b)(2). This question of U.S. recognition of Indian tribes for purposes
of eligibility under NAGPRA forms the nub of my critique in this Part. See infra notes
103-09, and accompanying text.
With specific regard to repatriation, NAGPRA provides:
(a) Repatriation of Native American Human Remains and Objects Possessed
or Controlled by Federal Agencies and Museums
(1) If ... the cultural affiliation of Native American human remains ...
with a particular Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization is
established, then the Federal agency or museum, upon the request of a
known lineal descendant of the Native American or of the tribe or
organization.., shall expeditiously return such remains...
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implementation of NAGPRA to repatriate (or not) mortal remains to
Native American communities.98
Preliminary to any consideration of NAGPRA's mortal remains
repatriation provisions are questions of the identifiability, or not, of
the remains themselves, often more than a hundred, several

(4) Where cultural affiliation of Native American human remains.., has
not been established.., then, upon request... such Native American
human remains and funerary objects shall be expeditiously returned where
the requesting Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization can show
cultural affiliation by a preponderance of the evidence based upon
geographical, kinship, biological, archaeological, anthropological, linguistic,
folkloric, oral traditional, historical, or other relevant information or expert
opinion.

25 U.S.C. § 3005(a).
NAGPRA also provides for the return of remains uncovered through excavation
or other discovery on federal or tribal land, articulating ownership rights as follows:
(a) Native American human remains and objects.
The ownership or control of Native American cultural items which are
excavated or discovered on Federal or tribal lands after November 16, 1990
[the date of NAGPRA's enactment] shall be (with priority given in the order
listed)(1) in the case of Native American human remains and associated funerary
objects, in the lineal descendants of the Native American; or
(2) in any case in which such lineal descendants cannot be ascertained, and
in the case of unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of
cultural patrimony(A) in the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization on whose tribal
land such objects or remains were discovered;
(B) in the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization which has the
closest cultural affiliation with such remains or objects and which, upon
notice, states a claim for such remains or objects; or
(C) if the cultural affiliation of the objects cannot be reasonably
ascertained and if the objects were discovered on Federal land that is
recognized by a final judgment of the Indian Claims Commission or the
United States Court of Claims as the aboriginal land of some Indian tribe(1) in the Indian tribe that is recognized as aboriginally occupying the
area in which the objects were discovered, if upon notice, such tribe states a
claim for such remains or objects, or
(2) if it can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a different
tribe has a stronger cultural relationship with the remains or objects than
the tribe or organization specified in paragraph (1), in the Indian tribe that
has the strongest demonstrated relationship, if upon notice, such tribe states
a claim for such remains or objects.
25 U.S.C. § 3002(a).
Finally, the statute makes clear that its repatriation provisions are prompted
by the U.S. government's unique history and relationship with Indian tribes, and that
NAGPRA should not be construed as setting precedent for any other individual, group,
or foreign government. Id. § 3010.
98. I address issues of the excavation and discovery of Native American mortal
remains on federal and tribal lands in my Treading on Hallowed Ground, KY. L. J.
(forthcoming 2005/06).
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hundred, or even several thousand years old, as amply illustrated by
the so-called "Kennewick Man" controversy,99 where the remains at
issue were estimated at 8340 to 9200 years old.100 Questions raised
by the Kennewick Man case and others include what to do with
remains that cannot be identified or attributed to a particular tribe.
When NAGPRA was enacted, Congress directed the Department of
Interior to issue regulations governing the treatment of culturally
unidentifiable objects, including mortal remains. Fifteen years later,
the Department still has not issued these regulations and cases
involving culturally unidentifiable remains continue to sit on the
NAGPRA Review Committee's docket, lacking official guidance on
this matter.o1
Another question not addressed by NAGPRA or its implementing
regulations is what to do with remains that are multiply attributable
between and among Native American peoples and tribes, i.e., where

99. Bonnichsen v. United States, 357 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that
remains were named for the town near where the remains were found).
100. The Kennewick Man was discovered on federal land managed by the Army
Corps of Engineers by teenagers attending a boat race on Oregon's Columbia River. Id.
at 967. Pursuant to the county coroner's request, the remains were removed and
studied by an anthropologist pursuant to a permit under the Archaeological Resources
Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (2005). Id. A group of scientists who
wished to study the remains further filed suit to enjoin the Department of the Interior
from repatriating the remains to certain Indian tribes for reburial. Id. at 968. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld the district court's judgment granting an
injunction against "transfer of the skeleton for immediate burial" and instead
permitted the scientists to study the remains. Id. at 967. Where 9,000 year old human
remains could not be classified as "Native American" under NAGPRA, the Ninth
Circuit set aside the agency decision awarding remains to a coalition of five Native
American tribes, which had petitioned for repatriation as a unit, and enjoined transfer
of remains to tribal coalition, instead requiring that plaintiff archeologists be allowed
to study remains pursuant to Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §
470aa-470mm. Id. at 966-69. See generally Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural
Property: The Protectionof Cultural Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559
(1995) (providing a helpful analysis of the significance of the Kennewick skeleton); see
also Patty Gerstenblith, Cultural Significance and the Kennewick Skeleton, in
CLAIMING THE STONES, NAMING THE BONES: CULTURAL PROPERTY AND THE
NEGOTIATION OF NATIONAL AND ETHNIC IDENTITY 162, 163-67 (Elazar Barkan &
Ronald Bush eds., 2002).
101. See 43 C.F.R. § 10.11. A section of the Code of Federal Regulations has been set
aside, or "reserved," for this purpose. Id. ("Disposition of culturally unidentifiable
human remains") (reserved for future articulation pursuant to NAGPRA). While the
Department of the Interior has yet to issue regulations on this issue, fifteen years after
the statute's enactment, it has established a database of culturally unidentifiable
human remains as part of its NAGPRA compliance activities. NATIONAL PARK
SERVICE, DEP'T OF INTERIOR, NATIONAL NAGPRA ONLINE DATABASES, at
http://www.cr.nps.gov/nagpra/onlinedb/index.htm.
As of November, 2005, "[the
database] includes 16,123 records describing 118,259 Native American human
remains.. .inventoried by 601 museums and Federal agencies." Id.
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multiple lineal descendants and/or tribal entities have claims to the
remains? Who is to decide? And why is ongoing federal custody the
default position for these remains,102 given NAGPRA's purpose to
return mortal remains from federal possession to that of Native
American communities?
Ultimately, my critique of NAGPRA centers on the federal
government's role as gatekeeper for the repatriation of Native
American mortal remains, where the U.S. government has assumed
the power to grant or withhold official recognition to tribes,103 and
thus controls who is eligible under NAGPRA's repatriation
provisions.04 A practice dating at least from the 1934 Indian
Reorganization Act,105 the federal government continues to maintain
102. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
103. The Mashpee Indians of Massachusetts, for example, have been judicially
determined not to be a tribe recognized by U.S. law by virtue of their failure to satisfy,
on a continuous basis, the U.S. Supreme Court's standard for tribal identity
articulated in Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901) (providing, "By a
'tribe' we understand a body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a
community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though
sometimes ill-defined territory .. "); see also Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun,
Translating 'Yonnondio' by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 177, 179-80
(Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
104. See supra note 97 for detailed provisions on who is eligible to claim benefits
under NAGPRA. The National Park Service's published answers to Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs) addresses the potential for consideration of claims filed by nonrecognized tribes as follows:
Under NAGPRA, only Federally recognized Native American tribes,
Native Alaskan villages and corporations, and Native Hawaiian
organizations may claim cultural items. NAGPRA does not require museums
and Federal agencies to consult with nonfederally recognized tribes.
However, the [NAGPRA] Review Committee has recognized that there are
some cases in which non-federally recognized tribes may be appropriate
claimants for cultural items. Museums, if they wish, may consult with nonfederally recognized tribes .... Museums and Federal agencies that wish to
return Native American human remains and cultural items to non-federally
recognized tribes must make a request for review of a proposed disposition to
the Review Committee.
National Park Service, FAQS, supra note 97 (emphasis omitted). At least one court has
determined that NAGPRA's repatriation provisions extend beyond federally recognized
tribes to other "aggregations" of Native Americans that have received funds and other
assistance from the federal government. See Abenaki Nation of Missiquoi v. Hughes,
805 F. Supp. 234, 251 (D. Vt. 1992), aff'd, 990 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1993).
105. Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. 461-479 (2005) (also known as the
Wheeler-Howard Act) (instructing, "Hereafter no land of any Indian reservation,
created or set apart by treaty or agreement with the Indians, Act of Congress,
Executive order, purchase, or otherwise, shall be allotted in severalty to any Indian.").
When a Native American entity seeks official recognition as a tribe for
purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act and access to attendant federal benefits, it
must describe in full its membership criteria, whether one-half, one-quarter, or some
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its role as granter of official tribal status and keeper of lists of
recognized tribes, where different federal lists exist for different
purposes. 0 6 Where a given tribe is not recognized as an official tribal
entity, it is excluded from access to benefits under federal
law.107Again, while the Park Service's list of Indian tribes authorized
to make claims under NAGPRA is different, and broader in scope,
than the Bureau of Indian Affairs' list, they both involve the federal
government as gatekeeper of identity and rights.
Likewise raising concerns for the ways in which tribal identity
has been regulated by the federal government, commentator James
Nason observes, "given the often peculiar history of federal
recognition (and derecognition) of tribal communities, it was
inevitable that there would be debates over the federal list of
recognized tribes."o8 A specific consequence for our concerns for the
federal government's role as gatekeeper is that the National Park
Service's Recommendations Regarding the Disposition of Culturally
Unidentifiable Native American Human Remains deem remains
attributable to non-officially-recognized tribes as falling within the
category of culturally unidentifiable remains,109 which again have yet
to see regulations articulated providing for their disposition.

other variation of blood quantum. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(d) (setting forth criteria for United
States' recognition of official tribal status).
106. The National Park Service notes that there are "763 federally recognized
Indian tribes-including Alaska Native villages and corporations," that have standing
to make requests under NAGPRA. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, NPS-28: CULTURAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT GUIDELINE; APPENDIX R: NAGPRA COMPLIANCE (2002)
[hereinafter NPS-28: CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT GUIDELINE], available at
http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online-books/nps28/28appenr.htm. The Bureau of Indian
Affairs also maintains a list, though less numerous in scope. See "Indian Entities
Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian
Affairs," 68 Fed. Reg. 68,180 (Dec. 5, 2003) (listing "562 tribal entities recognized as
eligible for funding and services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs by virtue of their
status as Indian tribes.").
107. The U.S. government's determination whether to recognize a tribe has
enormous consequence, especially given the unreviewability of its conclusion, deemed
a political question for constitutional purposes. See THE HONORABLE WILLIAM C.
CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 5 (1988) ("The action of the federal government in
recognizing or failing to recognize a tribe has traditionally been held to be a political
one not subject to judicial review.") (citing U.S. v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 419 (1866)).
108. James D. Nason, Beyond Repatriation: Cultural Policy and Practice for the
Twenty-first Century, in BORROWED POWER: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL APPROPRIATION 291,
300 (Bruce Ziff & Pratima V. Rao eds., 1997).
109. National Park Service, Department of the Interior, Recommendations
Regarding the Disposition of Culturally Unidentifiable Native American Human
Remains, 65 Fed. Reg. 36,462, 36,463 (June 8, 2000) (providing, "A Federal agency or
museum determination that human remains are culturally unidentifiable may occur
for different reasons. At present, three categories are recognized: a. Those for which
cultural affiliation could be determined except that the appropriate Native American
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Beyond my concern for the federal government's gatekeeping
role in granting or withholding official recognition to tribes, which
seems a type of externalized race determination, or classification, 11o I
seek to problematize questions of Native American identity for
purposes of NAGPRA implementation by highlighting the potential
for multiplicity of identity, conflicting and indeterminate identity,
and emerging pan-Indian identity, all of which NAGPRA fails
adequately to address.I'
First, as noted above, NAGPRA fails to recognize the potential
for multiple vectors of tribal identity held by a given Native
American individual, a possibility that must be anticipated given the

organization is not Federally recognized as an Indian tribe ....
"). The
recommendations do suggest, however, that one appropriate disposition of culturally
unidentifiable mortal remains is repatriation to the non-Federally recognized Native
American group. Id.
A year earlier, the statutorily-mandated NAGPRA Review Committee had
articulated Draft Principles of Agreement Regarding the Disposition of Culturally
Unidentifiable Human Remains, which, inter alia,provided:
Human remains that are, technically, culturally unidentifiable because the
appropriate claimant is not federally recognized, may be repatriated once
federal recognition has been granted, or if the claimant works with another
culturally affiliated, federally recognized Indian tribe (example - the Titicut
site / Mashpee case).
64 Fed. Reg. 41,135, 41,136 (July 29, 1999). Thus, a further illustration of the
centrality of federal recognition of tribal status to the exercise of rights created by
NAGPRA.
110. But see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) (sanctioning Indian
preference program as not based on race, but, rather, "designed to further the cause of
Indian self-government"). Mancari has been cited for the proposition that questions of
Indian tribal status are not questions of race. See id. at 553 ("Contrary to the
characterization made by appellees, this preference does not constitute 'racial
discrimination.' Indeed, it is not even a 'racial' preference."). See generally Nell Jessup
Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 195, 285-87 (1984) (discussing Court's reasoning in Mancari and its impact on
subsequent cases).
111. See Rosemary J. Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Possession of
Identity, in BORROWED POWER: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL APPROPRIATION, supra note 108,
at 74, 86-87. Coombe advises:
Lawyers and judges who address legal questions of identity should keep in
mind its kaleidoscopic nature. They should examine the multiple
contributions given to any definition of identity. They ought to examine the
pattern of power relationships within which an identity is forged. And they
need to explore the pattern of power relationships within which a question of
identity is framed ...who picks an identity and who is consigned to it?
Id. at 86 (quoting Martha Minow, Identities, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97, 98-99 (1991))
(omission in original). Subsequently, Coombe notes, "It is precisely the inability to
name themselves and a continuous history of having their identities defined by others
that First Nations peoples foreground when they oppose practices of cultural
appropriation." Id.

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1

phenomenon of inter-marriage and children born thereto.112 While it
is readily anticipable that multiple claims might be lodged to any
particular set of remains as a result of this potential for multiplicity
of identity,113 NAGPRA's implementation to date has not
satisfactorily addressed this possibility, where it recognizes the
potential for joint claims,114 but does not have a satisfactory
mechanism for resolving conflicting claims. NAGPRA establishes a
seven person review committee to hear disputes related to
repatriation, where three members are nominated by Native
American communities, three by the museum and scientific
communities, and one by the Secretary of the Interior upon whom the
first two groups must agree.115 Review of the NAGPRA Review
112. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (barring federal
court review of tribal membership rules regarding children of inter-marriage); see also
Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 715 (1989).
113. See, e.g., Dr. Erica-Irene A. Daes, Fifth Annual Tribal Sovereignty Symposium:
The Indispensable Function of the Sacred, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 29 (2000). Dr. Daes,
Chairperson-Rapporteur with the working group on Indigenous Populations, asks:
What about many of the North Americans who are of mixed ancestry such as
"mixed-bloods" or "cross-bloods." A great many of them do not satisfy racial
criteria for official membership in Indian tribes. But have they lost their
spiritual responsibilities simply because some of their ancestors were not
indigenous? Can the United States government explain to us how much
Indian blood a person must have before they can legitimately claim a
connection to their ancestors' sacred sites? The idea that "blood quantum" is
a measure of a person's spirit is, to me, both bizarre and repugnant to the
fundamental meaning of spirituality.
Id. at 33 (footnote omitted). See also Darren Hutchinson's work on multiplicity of
identities and anti-discrimination law and theory, including, Hutchinson, supra note
79.
114. 60 Fed. Reg. 62,152.
115. NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3006 ("Review Committee"). NAGPRA charges the
Review Committee, in relevant part, as follows:
(3) upon the request of any affected party, review a and mak[e] findings
related to (A) the identity or cultural affiliation of cultural items, or
(B) the return of such items;
(4) facilitat[e] the resolution of any disputes among Indian tribes, Native
Hawaiian organizations, or lineal descendants and Federal agencies or
museums relating to the return of such items including convening the
parties to the dispute if deemed desirable;
(5) compil[e] an inventory of culturally unidentifiable human remains that
are in the possession or control of each Federal agency and museum and
recommending specific actions for developing a process for disposition of such
remains.
Id. NAGPRA's implementing regulations suggest that the Review Committee "may
aid" in the resolution of disputes regarding the repatriation of human remains, and
that the U.S. District Court has "jurisdiction over any action brought that alleges a
violation of the Act." 43 C.F.R. § 10.17(a) (2005) ("Dispute resolution"). Subsequently,
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Committee's reports reveals a striking inadequacy in their treatment
of issues of multiplicity of identity.116 NAGPRA's failure to recognize
the regulations note:
The Review Committee may facilitate the informal resolution of disputes
relating to these regulations among interested parties that are not resolved
by good faith negotiations. Review Committee actions may include convening
meetings between parties to disputes, making advisory findings as to
contested facts, and making recommendations to the disputing parties or to
the Secretary as to the proper resolution of disputes consistent with these
regulations and the Act.
Id. § 10.17(b).
116. In its Report to Congress for 1999, 2000, and 2001, the Review Committee
included as Appendix VI.i a list of dispute assistance requests, noting the parties to
the dispute, the issue involved, and the action taken, if any. Among the disputes
considered is one involving fifteen claimants to mortal remains under NAGPRA and
the U.S. Marine Corps, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, NATIONAL NAGPRA REPORTS (Oct.
1, 2002 to Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/nagpra/DOCUMENTS/
NNReport03O5.pdf, where the final action reported taken by the Review Committee
was to "declined to consider the dispute" and recommend "that the U.S. Marine Corps
retain possession of the human remains and associated funerary objects until the
claimants agree upon the proper recipient(s)." Id. at 17. Hence my concern for
NAGPRA's default of defeat, i.e., continued federal custody of remains where there is
conflict or uncertainty. Id.
Other disputes noted in the 1991-2001 Review Committee report include:
The Hopi Tribe sought the Review Committee's help in resolving a
dispute with the National Park Service regarding the cultural affiliation
of particular mortal remains. As of the report date, "the Review
Committee Chair... ha[s] not determined whether the Review
Committee should consider the dispute." Id.
The American Indian Intertribal Association (AIIA) sought the
Committee's help in a dispute over the cultural affiliation of mortal
remains held by the University of Toledo, where the Committee has "not
determined whether [it] should consider the dispute. AIIA is not a
federally recognized Indian tribe and one consideration is whether AJIA
qualifies as an 'affected party' under NAGPRA. Id. at 19.
Likewise:
The Piro-Manso-Tiwa, not an officially recognized tribe per the U.S.
government's gatekeeping function, sought assistance to resolve a
dispute with the National Park Service regarding mortal remains, where
the Committee had "not determined whether [it] should consider the
dispute. One consideration is whether the Piro-Manso-Tiwa qualifies as
an 'affected party' under NAGPRA." Id.
The Sand Creek Massacre Descendant's Trust and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs had a dispute concerning the repatriation of mortal remains,
where the committee had not yet determined its jurisdiction to hear the
dispute where the trust was not a recognized tribal entity. Id.
But see National Park Service, Department of the Interior, Findings of the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Review Committee, 65 Fed. Reg. 6,621,
6,622 (Feb. 10, 2000). In a case involving the competing claims of 20 tribes and the
Chaco Culture National Historical Park, the Review Committee determined that the
National Park Service had inadequately consulted with the tribes at issue and that,
rather than making broad determinations of cultural affiliation, the Park Service
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in a more nuanced and systematic fashion the potential for
multiplicity of tribal identity, taken together with the Park Service's
failure after fifteen years to provide guidance on the disposition of
unidentifiable remains, render NAGPRA an inadequate tool in
addressing the potential complexity of Native American identity.
Indeed, direct inquiry of officials charged with implementing
NAGPRA reveals a notable failure to anticipate or address these
issues.117
Rather than creating an effective mechanism for resolving
conflict, federal implementation of NAGPRA has the potential to
spawn both intra- and inter-tribal conflict over the repatriation of
mortal remains.lls Again, rather than seeking to address these
should have conducted one-on-one consultations that would have teased out more sitespecific evidence of cultural affiliation for the particular mortal remains and funerary
objects in dispute. Specifically, the Review Committee recommended:
It is the recommendation of the Review Committee that the Chaco
Culture National Historical Park withdraw its published Notice of Inventory
Completion and reassess its determination of cultural affiliation. The Review
Committee recommends that this reassessment specifically consider the
following issues:
1. Determination of cultural affiliation should be made on a site-by-site
basis, assessing each site based on the specific data available;
2. While collective consultation can be useful, it should not be used in lieu of
individual tribal consultation when requested by an Indian tribe;
3. A proper determination of cultural affiliation necessarily requires the
critical evaluation and careful weighing of all available evidence. This
weighing should emphasize group identity, time period, specific cultural
practices, and traceable cultural continuity.

Id.
117. The first level response was that conflicts among lineal descendants had never
arisen, and the second level response was that should they arise and be irresolvable,
the subject property would remain in federal custody until resolved. Email from
NAGPRA office of the National Park Service to Mary L. Clark (Sept. 20, 2005) (on file
with author).
118. See, e.g., STUART SPEAKER, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, THE HUMAN REMAINS
OF ISHI, A YAHI-YANA INDIAN, IN THE NATIONAL MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY,

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REPATRIATION (Apr.
21, 1999), availableat http://www.nmnh.si.edu/anthro/ishirpt.htm, recounting:
The tragic history of the Yana led to the virtual destruction of the tribe and
the deaths of nearly all its members. Although the Yana tribe no longer
exists as a social unit, and people of Yana descent are scattered among
several federally-recognized tribes in northern California, as well as among
the unrecognized Native Americans, the Yana legacy continues to be a vital
part of the Redding Rancheria and Pit River Tribe. Based on the facts of
Ishi's Yana culture and the Yana heritage of the Redding Rancheria and Pit
River Tribes, the RO recommends that the NMNH offer Ishi's remains to
these two groups.
Id; see also Harding, Justifying Repatriation,supra note 10, at 724. Harding points to
the example of the American Museum of Natural History, which she notes:
has in its possession a calico-wrapped sacred bundle that belonged to Plains
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potential conflicts, the National Park Service, with broad jurisdiction
over NAGPRA enforcement, simply notes that ongoing federal
custody is the default position where no one conflicting claim
prevails, despite clear statutory intent to return remains from
federal custody to tribal communities.119 I call this the "default of
defeat."
Further on the issue of the potential for complexity of Native
American identity not recognized by NAGPRA, some Native
American and other commentators have noted an emerging "panIndian" movement, mainly among urban Native Americans, where
affiliation with a specific tribe is not deemed as important as

Cree Chief Big Bear until his death. The sacred bundle was given to the
institution fifty years ago by an unnamed native with the instructions, "keep
it well." Now there are numerous tribes and individuals claiming ownership
of the bundle. The Montana, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba Crees are all
independently claiming ownership as is the adopted great-great-grandson of
Plains Cree Chief Big Bear. Determining who owned the bundle after Big
Bear's death, and thus whether the transfer was legitimate, will not be an
easy task.
Id. (citations omitted).
In view of these conflicting claims, Harding asserts:
[T]here must be some justification for asserting Native American ownership
when there is no clear evidence in support of tribal ownership. The purpose
of this Article is to identify and discuss arguments that might provide such a
justification. Although NAGPRA has spawned the most recent repatriations
and in fact has created the most significant and widespread return of Native
American objects to date, my search for a justification will go well beyond
interpreting the Act.
Id. at 725.
119. National Park Service, Department of the Interior, NAGPRA Regulations, 43
C.F.R. § 10.15(a)(2), providing, "If there is more than one claimant, the human
remains... may be held by the responsible museum or Federal agency or person in
possession thereof pending resolution of the claim." Accord NPS-28: CULTURAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT GUIDELINE, supra note 106. Specifically, the compliance
guidance instructs:
The NPS may retain control of Native American human remains, funerary
objects, sacred objects, or objects of cultural patrimony that would otherwise
be repatriated or disposed of to a lineal descendant, Indian tribe, or Native
Hawaiian organization under the regulations if any of the three exemptions
apply [including]: (1) there are multiple disputing claimants. ...
The NPS may retain control of human remains, funerary objects, sacred
objects, or objects of cultural patrimony that are discovered, excavated, or
part of a collection if there are multiple disputing claims and the agency
cannot determine by a preponderance of the evidence which requesting party
is the most appropriate recipient. The disputed items may be retained until
the requesting parties mutually agree on the appropriate recipient or the
dispute is otherwise resolved pursuant to the regulations or by a court of
competent jurisdiction. There is no set time during which multiple claims
must be resolved.
Id. at (7)(d).
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identification with Native American people overall.120 For pan-Indian
movement adherents, regaining control over Native American
remains by removing them from federal custody is more important
than determining the specific tribe to which the remains should be
repatriated, especially where the difficulty of making such
determinations keeps them in federal hands.121 Writing in the
context of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990,122 enacted at the
same time as NAGPRA and with a similar goal of preserving Native
American cultural heritage, William Hapiuk notes the rejection by
some Native Americans of recognized tribal classifications:
For some of these individuals, their identity as an "Indian" is
not much bound with membership in an institution produced by
imperialism. To insist on tribal membership, especially when
the membership requirements often "apen" former colonial
policies that "advance[] genetics as the linchpin of identity" in
their insistence on blood quantum, might be morally repugnant,
ideologically impossible. For some "post-Indians," the entire
enterprise of naming-of tribes or individuals-represents the
inevitable, inescapable, and ultimately absurd logic of federal
Indian law.123
By setting the default in cases of complex identity as the status quo,
i.e., continued federal custody, the National Park Service's guidelines
defeat not only NAGPRA's spirit, but that of the Pan-Indian
movement as well. 124
According to Hapiuk, pan-Indian identity is a burgeoning
phenomenon especially among younger Native Americans reared offreservation.125 UCLA sociologist Duane Champagne likewise predicts
that "[w]ith the coming of age of second- and third-generation offreservation people," "[t]his group may well be on their [sic] way to
creating an intertribal, ethnic Native American identity and

120. William J. Hapiuk, Jr., Of Kitsch and Kachinas: A Critical Analysis of the
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1063 (2001).
121. Id.
122. Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. § 305e(c) (2005).
123. Hapiuk, supra note 120, at 1062-64.
124. This default of defeat is reminiscent of Title VII cases in which complainants
state multiple bases of discrimination-race and sex and age-and courts have
responded by asserting that the statute does not provide a cause of action for older
black women, but, rather, for the old, the African-American, or the female. Absent a
choice of one attribute, to the subordination of others, some courts will reject the Title
VII claim. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex:
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 150-51. So too with the federal
government's refereeing of multiple claims under NAGPRA.
125. Hapiuk, supra note 120, at 1063.
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Staying with this theme of pan-Indian identity, David Wilkins
has remarked:
The very idea of "American Indians," a historical misnomer,
now encapsulates a distinctly "Indian" identity, that is distinct
from one's tribal identity. Indeed. . . "increasingly for large
numbers of Indians, Indian identity-as distinct from tribal
identity-has become a conscious and important basis of action
and thought in its own right. A host of 'American Indian' and
'Native American' organizations testify to its salience, as do the
numerous cooperative political efforts by Indian groups and
organizations on behalf of both tribal and supratribal
interests."127
While there is a spectrum of views on the centrality of tribal identity
to individual Native American identity and related concern for ideas
of individual vs. group personhood, NAGPRA and its implementation
scheme fails altogether to address the Pan-Indian phenomenon.
My critique of NAGPRA is one of the few articulated in the legal
academic literature,128 where much of the NAGPRA scholarship to
126. Id. (quoting Duane Champagne, Introduction: Change, Deconstruction, and
Renewal of Native American Cultures at the End of the Twentieth Century, in
CONTEMPORARY NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL ISSUES 7, 9 (Duane Champagne ed.,
1999)) (alterations in the original); see also Alan R. Velie, Indian Identity in the
Nineties, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 189, 196 (1998) ("While it is still true that most
Indians derive their sense of Indianness from their tribe, detribalized urban Indians
generally derive their sense of identity from participating in pan-Indian rituals at
places like community centers.").
127. David Wilkins, An Inquiry Into Indigenous PoliticalParticipation:Implications
for Tribal Sovereignty, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 732, 743 (2000) (quoting STEPHEN
CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE-AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL RESURGENCE 107
(1988)).
128. Sarah Harding, for example, has written of NAGPRA's potential for reframing
understandings of the principal value of cultural property as group-based, given the
statute's emphasis on group-based cultural interests, and its recognition, indeed,
requirement, of group-based claims for repatriation. Nevertheless, as Harding notes,
Native American and other indigenous cultures may not be so clear in the absence of
NAGPRA's mechanics that these are group-based and not also or alternatively
individual interests. See Sarah Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 291, 305-06 (1999) [hereinafter Harding, Value, Obligationand Cultural
Heritage] (observing, "Setting aside the difficult task of determining whether
indigenous peoples actually favor communal property over private property, and the
difficulty of even applying these concepts in non-Western contexts, there is evidence
that much of what is important in indigenous societies and source nations depends on
exclusivity, not just with respect to the world outside of their cultural and territorial
boundaries, but within these boundaries too. For example, many of the songs and
dances associated with the potlatch of the Northwest Kwakiutl ... are under the
exclusive possession and control of particular individuals. The same can be said of
some of the songs of the Suy or the sacred objects of the Australian aboriginal people.
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date has embraced it as a model for the repatriation of cultural
property to indigenous peoples worldwide. In critiquing NAGPRA, I
do not mean to detract from recognition that it was intended to
promote the agency and autonomy of tribes. Indeed, NAGPRA was
enacted after more than twenty years of lobbying by members of the
Native American community, and many of NAGPRA's proponents
consider it critically important human rights legislation,129 both
symbolically and actually.130 Indeed, some commentators have
likened NAGPRA to a form of reparations for the United States'
official history of abuse of Native Americans.131
Nevertheless, I persist in my critique, where, for example, the
critical race theory literature underscores the potentially damaging
consequences of externalized race determinations or constructions,
arguably at issue here given the U.S. government's role in granting
or withholding official recognition of tribal status.
In critiquing NAGPRA, then, I am mindful of the difficulties of
attempting to determine the best interests of affected Native
American parties, given the broad range of peoples and cultures
encompassed within the Native American community-past, present,
and future-and given the wide range of attitudes regarding

So exclusivity, a traditional hallmark of private ownership and possession, is very
much present in indigenous practices.").
129. See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, Cultural Significance and the Kennewick
Skeleton, supra note 100, at 190 n.53 ("NAGPRA was recognized in its legislative
history as 'first and foremost, human rights legislation.' When NAGPRA was passed
by the Senate, Senator Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii) stated, 'In light of the important role
that death and burial rites play in native American cultures, it is all the more
offensive that the civil rights of America's first citizens have been so flagrantly
violated for the past century .... [T]he bill before us is not about the validity of
museums or the value of scientific inquiry. Rather, it is about human rights."'); see also
Angela R. Riley, Indian Remains, Human Rights: ReconsideringEntitlement Under the
Native American Graves Protection and RepatriationAct, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REv. 49, 60 (2002) (referencing NAGPRA as significant human rights legislation).
130. See, e.g., Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, supra note 128, at
301-02, observing:
An increasing number of scholars and official documents, both international
and domestic, take the view that the disposition of cultural heritage should
be determined exclusively by source nations or culturally-affiliated groups.
As a consequence, we increasingly view cultural heritage as an issue of
cultural, ethnic, or in some cases minority rights, and as one of the keys to
cultural preservation and self-determination....
One of the most important issues with respect to cultural heritage is the
historical denial of indigenous peoples' right to determine the fate of their
own cultural heritage and to protect it from violation and theft. This is very
much central to any discussion about the disposition of cultural heritage.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
131. See, e.g., id. at 301 n.43.
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questions of identity, from more individual to largely group-based.132
At a minimum, I seek to avoid giving undue emphasis to individual
interests over those of the group, an emphasis arguably symptomatic
of liberal, autonomy-oriented traditions.133 Instead, this Article is an
invitation to consider legal recognition of a range of attachments to
mortal remains, from individual and group personhood, to tribal
affiliation, and pan-Indian identity. 134
What reforms to NAGPRA would I propose?135 I would retain
NAGPRA's human rights spirit and goals, but amend its
132. See, e.g., Harding, Justifying Repatriation, supra note 10, at 764-65 ("It is
impossible to speak of a unified Native American view on human remains. Some tribes
believe that the human spirit is connected with the remains until they are completely
decomposed. Walter Echo-Hawk, an advocate for repatriation, states that '[m]ost of the
tribes believe that if you rob the dead.., it disturbs the spirit and visits harm upon
not only those who disturbed the grave, but on the relatives of the dead who allowed
that to happen.' For example, the Kumeyaay believe that if the remains of an ancestor
are disturbed, the spirit returns from the afterworld and remains in pain until the
remains are again returned to the earth. But there are other tribes who have no
interest in the remains of their ancestors. The Mesquakie tribe believes that four days
after death the spirit leaves the remains and never returns.").
133. I am mindful of the rich literature exploring tensions between individual and
group-based rights models. See, e.g., Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural
Heritage, supra note 128, at 304-05 (With respect to cultural heritage, "[tihere is a
presumption that Western nations prefer private ownership and source nations or
indigenous peoples prefer group or common ownership."). See also Harding, Justifying
Repatriation,supra note 10, at 760, noting:
Moustakas argues that objects that serve as historical records or that are
strong cultural symbols promote "grouphood." Such property is substantially
bound up with group identity and to interfere with group control of it
undermines the group's existence and well-being. This justifies the
repatriation of most cultural patrimony, including most Native American
cultural patrimony. Thus in the absence of a clear and legitimate transfer by
the tribe, the concept of "property for grouphood" provides a sufficient reason
to override other potentially legitimate but less intimate interests. But
Moustakas goes one step further arguing that cultural patrimony which can
be said to be "property for grouphood" should be strictly inalienable; it should
never be separated from its affiliated group even if the group itself decides
the property is no longer of any value.
Id.; Volpp, supranote 3.
134. An obvious counter to my critique is that NAGPRA authorizes repatriation to
lineal descendants, outside of the tribal recognition realm. Since lineal descendency is
not tribe-dependent, what's the problem? Isn't personhood promoted through this
avenue of repatriation? My response is that that is not sufficient where, by failing to
anticipate or address satisfactorily the potential for multiplicity of identity and
multiplicity of competing claims, NAGPRA invites intra- and inter-tribal conflict,
which in turn undermines personhood and other values.
135. In considering this question, I looked inter alia to Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2]
(1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, in which the Australian Supreme Court "recognized the existence
of Native Title in Australia and debunked the notion of terra nullius (literally 'land
belonging to no one'), which had previously dominated Australian jurisprudence vis-avis Native lands."' Carlos Scott Lopez, Reformulating Native Title in Mabo's Wake:

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1

implementation scheme to address more comprehensively the
potential for uncertainty of identity, multiplicity of identity, and panIndian identity.136 Likewise, I would depart from the current
presumption of continued federal custody in the face of competing
claims for repatriation. Ultimately, I would call for a reconsideration
of the merits of the federal government's role as granter or
withholder of official tribal recognition, given its history of and
potential for abuse.
CONCLUSION

As a variant on the question "who owns native culture?,"137 this
Article asks "who owns dead bodies?" And, because traditional
property law dictates that no one owns dead bodies (again, they are
res nullius, literally "a thing owned by no one"),138 I've reframed the
Aboriginal Sovereignty and Reconciliation in Post-Centenary Australia, 11 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 21, 22 (2003). According to at least one commentator, Mabo was
"[h]eralded as 'one of the most significant court decision[s] in Australia's historyo,' it
was seen as a means for Native People to claim title over the lands that had been
taken away, regain rights that previously had been denied, and help end the
increasing destruction of, and 'injustice[s]' against, Aboriginal culture." Id. (alterations
in original).
136. I note in this regard that professional archaeologists adopted pre-NAGPRA a
code of self-regulation for the study and disposition of mortal remains, called the
"Vermillion Accords," that address the need for open communication among potentially
conflicting claimants to remains. The August 1989 Vermillion Accord (so-named
because adopted in Vermillion, South Dakota) provide:
Human Remains
1. Respect for the mortal remains of the dead shall be accorded to all
irrespective of origin, race, religion, nationality, custom and tradition.
2. Respect for the wishes of the dead concerning disposition shall be accorded
whenever possible, reasonable and lawful, when they are known or can be
reasonably inferred.
3. Respect for the wishes of the local community and of relatives or
guardians of the dead shall be accorded whenever possible, reasonable and
lawful.
4. Respect for scientific research value of skeletal, mummified and other
human remains (including fossil hominids) shall be accorded when such
value is demonstrated to exist.
5. Agreement on the disposition of fossil, skeletal, mummified and other
remains shall be reached by negotiation on the basis of mutual respect for
the legitimate concerns for communities or the proper disposition of their
ancestors, as well as the legitimate concerns of science and education.
6. The express recognition that the concerns of various ethnic groups, as well
as those of science, are legitimate and to be respected, will permit acceptable
agreements to be reached and honoured.
MICHAEL DAY, THE VERMILLION ACCORD (1989), reprinted in MIKE PARKER PEARSON,

THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF DEATH AND BURIAL 185 (D. Gentry Steele ed., Texas A&M Univ.
Press 2000).
137. See MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (2003).
138. See Rose, supra note 7, at 92.
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question as "who does, and who should, control the disposition of the
dead and final assignment of identity in death?"
The answer lies, at least in part, in recognition that death
constitutes our final and most enduring state. As with birth, death is
not principally characterized by attachment to nation-state, but,
rather, by forces of humanity, transcending boundaries.139 As with
birth, death invites celebration of the individual life as celebration of
the human experience. While a newborn may be embraced in part for
his or her anticipated service to the nation-state, that is just one of
many vectors upon which the new life is celebrated, and by no means
the principal one. Likewise at death, an individual may be celebrated
for his or her service to the nation-state, military or otherwise, but the
principal bases for grief and honor may well lie elsewhere-in family,
friendship, religion, and community.140
In addressing the state's interposition of authority to shape, or
constrain, ideas of honor, race, and identity in death, I return to the
bundle of sticks metaphor with which I began this piece. I argue that
the deceased's next of kin (again, defined broadly to include
whomever the deceased him or herself designates, whether family (by
blood, marriage, or otherwise), close friends, or other intimates)41
must be recognized as holding the most essential sticks in the
bundle, including rights to possess the body immediately following
death, rights to dispose of the body, rights to redress in case of
disinterment, consistent with traditional common law. What must
not happen is what has increasingly happened, that the state and/or
federal governments have imposed their interests by exercising
dominion and control over the dead, thereby disrupting interests of
individual agency, family, friendship, religion, and otherwise.
More specifically, while people have died, and continue to die, in
defense, or pursuit, of ideals of freedom, democracy, the rule of law,
etc., and while U.S. national cemeteries serve an important function
in honoring death in the service of these ideals, national identity
should not unquestionably trump attachments to personhood, family,
139. See Harding, Justifying Repatriation, supra note 10, at 770 ("[T]he burial of a
dead body is not a goal in itself. We go through the process of burying or otherwise
respectfully disposing of the remains of our deceased relatives in deference to their
memory and as a way of safeguarding human dignity.").
140. See id. at 768 ("Our attitude towards human remains provides a precedent for
establishing a separate category of goods that we view as ends in themselves. These
goods take on a purpose and a life which transcends the vagaries of specific human
ends.").
141. I wish to reiterate my intention that "family" not be given the crabbed
treatment it currently receives under federal law for purposes of U.S. national
cemetery burials. Rather, I give "family" as broad a definition as would the deceased,
so as to promote the agency of the deceased. See, e.g., FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED

MOTHER, supra note 17; see also Herndndez, supra note 7, at 1004-19.
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friendship and/or religion in death. Attachments in death should not
be viewed as exclusive. Instead, they are reconcilable through
reliance on human agency, i.e., through the empowering of the
deceased (or his or her designee) to decide whether and where to be
interred and with what identity or identifiers.
Again, what must not happen is what has become increasingly
common: the dead have been used as tools of the state (read as
"state" or "nation") to shape particular understandings of the state,
patriotism, ideal citizenship, global power, even cramped definitions
of the family, thereby marginalizing the potential for human agency,
self-constitution, and self-expression in death.
EPILOGUE: HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE FAILURE TO HONOR THE
DEAD IN NEW ORLEANS

As this Article was nearing completion, Hurricane Katrina
struck New Orleans, and the resulting levee breaks devastated the
city. Of particular relevance to this paper, over a thousand people
were killed, many by drowning, and the media was filled with stories
of dead bodies decaying in public, where public officials, did not fulfill
their responsibility to collect and identify the unclaimed dead in the
hurricane's immediate aftermath. Indeed, the state and federal
governments failed, even for weeks,142 to collect the bodies,
principally of the African American, poor, elderly, and disabled.143
142. See, e.g., Storm and Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005 (reporting that, 7 weeks
later, residents are still barred from returning to the Ninth Ward in New Orleans for
fear they will find dead bodies in their homes); see also Shaila Dewan, Returning
Home, a Handful FindBodies; New Orleans Mayor Presses to Reopen City, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 29, 2005, at 28 ("A few residents returning to their homes in this devastated
region have found the bodies of their loved ones, even in houses that have been
searched and marked, and the state emergency medical director warned Wednesday
night that more families could be in for a similar shock."); Shaila Dewan, Weeks Later,
Most Storm Victims Lie Unnamed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, at Al (reporting on
Louisiana's slow process in identifying Katrina's dead, where, with 972 deaths
confirmed, only 32 victims names have been released). This is in sharp contrast with
the recovery effort in New York City following the 9/11 attacks, where extraordinary
resources were devoted to identifying the dead through, sometimes tiny, fragments of
mortal remains. See, e.g., David W. Dunlap, Bone Fragments Found on a Roof Near
Ground Zero, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at B3 (reporting on recent discovery of bone
fragment on roof of Deutsche Bank building opposite World Trade Center site). But see
9/11 Families to Sue Over Remains, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2005 (reporting on suit
challenging desecration of 9/11 dead through failure to segregate mortal remains from
trade center debris at Fresh Kills, the former New York City garbage dump to which
much 9/11 waste was transported). This vast contrast in treatment further
underscores the race-based critique of the government's response to the devastation
wrought by Hurricane Katrina.
143. As the inter- and intra-governmental finger-pointing began to improve, the
state of Louisiana took the lead in collecting and identifying the dead, where the
degree of assistance provided by federal authorities remained a highly contested
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Government officials instead appeared to shun the dead, going so far
as to embargo photojournalistic images of Katrina's victims, literally
and figuratively seeking to render the dead invisible.144 Quite to the
contrary, however, the bodies became more and more visible,
putrefying actually and metaphorically in the public's eye. 145

matter. See, e.g., Owners of Nursing Home Charged in Deaths of 34, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
14, 2005, at Al:
After days of news reports of bodies in the streets of New Orleans, Ms.
Blanco (LA Gov.), with palpable frustration, said the state would bypass
FEMA and sign its own contract with the company, Kenyon Worldwide
Disaster Management.
'In recent days, I have spoken with FEMA officials and administration
officials to convey my absolute frustration regarding the lack of urgency and
the lack of respect involving the recovery of our people whose lives were lost
as a result of Hurricane Katrina,' Ms. Blanco said at a news conference in
Baton Rouge. 'We have pleaded for contract resolution. In death, as in life
our people deserve more respect than they have received.'
FEMA officials responded by saying that the recovery of bodies was a
state responsibility, while the federal role was to assist state officials.
144. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text, discussing FEMA's attempted
prohibition on the taking and dissemination of photos of dead bodies in New Orleans.
145. For Weeks, A Silent Plea from the Front Porch on Laurel Street Goes
Unanswered, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, at A19:
They took nearly two weeks to do it, making their way through streets in
Uptown that were never underwater, to the worn white house at 4734 Laurel
St. Mr. Jackson's body had been laid out on the front-porch bench - as
though for an interminable outdoor wake - waiting to be transported to some
semblance of dignity.
Anyone could see his body from the street, and many did. It cried out for
retrieval, lying there under a baby-blue blanket mottled with cigarette
burns, a bouquet of dead flowers resting nearby, as 90-degree days came and
went.
The loudest cries, though, came from the epitaph, scrawled in large letters
on the kind of yellow-green cardboard that seemed to glow in the dark and
taped to the house above the body's head. This was what it said:
ALCEDE JACKSON
b- d Aug. 31, 2005
Rest in Peace
In the Loving Arms of Jesus
'For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son (Jesus)
that whosoever believeth in Him, shall not perish but have everlasting
life!' John 3:16
For nearly two weeks, this was what it said. And not just from the porch.
Newspapers and at least one magazine published articles about the corpse
on Laurel Street, not to be confused with the corpse on Union Street. That
body, a black man's, locked in rigor mortis and flanked by traffic cones,
became a downtown landmark - as in, turn left at the corpse - before
someone picked it up late last week.
No, this was the corpse on Laurel Street, and photographs of it have
shouted from newspapers, a magazine, televisions, and the Internet ....

92
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Echoing themes developed above, the state's failure to respect
the dead in New Orleans through its failure to promptly collect,
identify, and return the dead to their loved ones, has had grave
consequences for the honor and identity of its citizens, with powerful
race, class, and other subordinated group dimensions.
I end, then, where I began, with concern for the potential
disparate race, class, and gender effects that state laws and practices
governing the disposition of the dead can and have had.
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APPENDIX A: LAWS GOVERNING DISPOSITION OF THE UNCLAIMED DEAD

Alabama (ALA. CODE § 22-19-23) (Distribution of unclaimed
bodies for scientific study, Claim to body by relatives)
"No notice shall be given, nor shall any such body or bodies
be delivered, if any person shall satisfy the authorities in
charge of said body or bodies that he or she is of any degree of
kin or is related by marriage to, or socially or otherwise
connected with and interested in, the deceased and shall claim
the said body or bodies for burial. In that event, it or they shall
be at once surrendered to such person for interment or shall be
buried at public expense at the request of such claimant, if a
relative by blood or a connection by marriage, provided he or
she is financially unable to supply such body or bodies with
burial. Such notice shall not be given, or such body be delivered,
if the deceased person was a traveler who died suddenly, in
which case the dead body shall be buried."
Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 12.65.100) (Unclaimed bodies)
"When a person dies and no person appears to claim the body
for burial, and no provision is made for the body under AS 13.52
[the Health Care Decisions Act, which, among other issues,
addresses organ donation], the Department of Health and
Social Services, upon notification, shall request a court order
authorizing the body to be plainly and decently buried or
cremated and the remains decently interred. A judicial officer
shall issue the requested order upon the sworn testimony or
statement of a representative of the Department of Health and
Social Services that a person has not appeared to claim the
body for burial and provision is not made for the body under AS
13.52."
Arizona (ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-831) (Duty to bury body of dead
person)
"B. If none of the persons named in subsection A is willing or
financially able to bury or provide other funeral and disposition
arrangements for a dead person, the county in which death
occurs shall bury or place in a permanent care crypt the dead
body or cremated remains of a dead body unless otherwise
directed by a person named in subsection A.. .or by the written
testamentary instruction of the decedent.
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C. If the county medical examiner or person performing the
duties of the county medical examiner knows that the dead
person is a member of a federally recognized Native American
tribe located in this state, the county medical examiner or
person performing the duties of the county medical examiner
must notify the tribe and give the tribe the opportunity to
provide for the person's burial or other funeral and disposition
arrangements ..."
Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-703) (Notice to Dep't. of
Anatomy of University of Arkansas)
"(a) Any person in charge of a prison, morgue, hospital,
funeral parlor, or mortuary; any person who is a public officer,
agent, or employee of the state, any county, or municipality;
and all persons coming into possession, charge, or control of any
human body which is unclaimed for burial shall notify the head
of the Department of Anatomy, or his designate, as agent for
the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, that the body,
if unclaimed, is available for use in the advancement or study of
medical science.
(b) For the purpose of notifying the University of Arkansas
for Medical Sciences of its availability, an 'unclaimed body' is
defined as a human body in the possession, charge, or control of
the persons ... for a period not to exceed forty-eight (48) hours,
during which time the right of any relative, next of kin, friend,
any representative of a fraternal society of which the deceased
was a member, or a representative of any charitable or religious
group to claim the body for burial purposes is recognized."
California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7104) (Coroner's
interment of indigent dead; Costs)
"(a) When no provision is made by the decedent, or where the
estate is insufficient to provide for interment and the duty of
interment does not devolve upon any other person residing in
the state or if such person can not after reasonable diligence be
found within the state the person who has custody of the
remains may require the coroner of the county where the
decedent resided at time of death to take possession of the
remains and the coroner shall inter the remains in the manner
provided for the interment of indigent dead."
Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-34-207) (Disposition of remains)
"After the institutions to which said unclaimed bodies have
been distributed by the anatomical board have completed the
scientific study of such unclaimed bodies, the remains thereof
shall in every case be disposed of by burial or cremation."
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Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-270) (Bodies for anatomical
purposes)
"The first selectman of any town, the mayor of any city, the
administrative head of any state correctional institution or the
superintendent or person in charge of any almshouse, asylum,
hospital, morgue or other public institution which is supported,
in whole or in part, at public expense, having in his possession
or control the dead body of any person which, if not claimed as
hereinafter provided, would have to be buried at public expense,
or at the expense of any such institution, shall, immediately
upon the death of such person, notify his relatives thereof, if
known, and, if such relatives are not known, shall notify the
person or persons bringing or committing him to such
institution. Such official shall, within twenty-four hours from
the time such body came into his possession or control, give
notice thereof to the Department of Public Health and shall
deliver such body to The University of Connecticut, the Yale
University School of Medicine or the University of Bridgeport
College of Chiropractic... The university receiving such body
shall not embalm such body for a period of at least forty-eight
hours after death, and any relative, either by blood or marriage,
or a legal representative of such deceased person may claim
such body during said period."
Delaware
16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2702 (Duties of public officers)
"Every public officer of this State or of any agency, county or
political subdivision thereof, who shall have or receive custody
or control of the body of any decedent.. . which body is not
claimed within a reasonable time by a surviving spouse or
relative of the decedent but not less than 120 hours following
the death of the decedent, and which body will require burial at
the expense of the State or of any agency, county or political
subdivision thereof, shall forthwith notify the Medical Council
of the existence and location of the dead body and of any
identification thereof."
16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2703 (Designation of recipient
approved institution)
"(a) The Medical Council shall promptly, upon receipt of
notice of the existence, location and identification of a dead
body pursuant to § 2702 of this title, designate one of the
approved institutions to receive such body for use, including
dissection, in connection with anatomical studies .... "
16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2704 (Disposition of remains)
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"Any approved institution which shall have received a dead
body pursuant to this subchapter shall, upon completion of the
study thereof, deliver the body as then constituted to the
coroner of the county in which such approved institution shall
be situate[d] for burial or cremation; ..

.

such an approved

institution may retain certain portions of said body for special
research or teaching purposes."
District of Columbia (D.C. CODE § 5-1411) (Delivery of body;
expenses)
"(a) ...If after a reasonable time, established by regulation

by the Mayor, no authorized person claims the body of the
decedent, the CME shall dispose of the body in accordance with
the law....
(c) Only the CME shall dispose unclaimed bodies in the
District without of next of kin or other means of disposition.
The Mayor shall prescribe fees and regulations for the storage
and disposal of unclaimed bodies."
Florida (FLA. STAT. § 406.52) (Retention of bodies (effective Oct.
1, 2005))
"All bodies received by the anatomical board shall be retained
in receiving vaults for a period of not less than 48 hours before
allowing their use for medical science; if at any time more
bodies are made available to the anatomical board than can be
used for medical science under its jurisdiction, or if a body shall
be deemed by the anatomical board to be unfit for anatomical
purposes, the anatomical board may notify, in writing, the
county commissioners or other legally authorized person ...to

cause it to be buried or cremated in accordance with the rules,
laws and practices for disposing of such unclaimed bodies.
However, prior to having any body buried or cremated, the
county shall make a reasonable effort to determine the identity
of the body and shall further make a reasonable effort to
contact any relatives of the deceased person. .. "
Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 31-21-21) (Delivery to board of certain
unclaimed bodies)
"(a) All public officers of this state and their assistants and
all officers and their deputies of every county, city, town, or
other municipality and of every prison, county correctional
institution, morgue, public hospital, health care facility,....
having control over any dead human body not dead from
contagious or infectious disease and required to be buried at
public expense are required to notify the board ...whenever
any such body comes into their possession or control. Such
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officers shall, without fee or reward, deliver the body and allow
such board and its duly authorized agents who may comply
with this chapter to remove such body and to provide for its use
only within this state, solely for the advancement of medical
science....
(b) A body described in subsection (a) of this Code section
shall in each and every instance be held and kept by the person
or persons having charge or control of it for at least 24 hours
after death, before delivery to such board or its agent for
distribution, during which period notice of the death of such
person shall be posted at the courthouse door of the county in
which such body is held."
Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 327-31) (Medical, etc., use of
unclaimed bodies authorized)
"A university, hospital, or institution within the State
authorized to teach and conduct research in medicine, anatomy,
or surgery or having a medical preparatory or medical graduate
course of instruction may receive from the department of health
the unclaimed body of any person required to be buried or
cremated at public expense and to use any such body for
medical education and research purposes."
Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-268) (Authorization for final
disposition)
"(c) In accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) of this
section, the mortician or person acting as such who first
assumes possession of a dead body or stillborn fetus shall
obtain an authorization for final disposition prior to final
disposal or removal from the state of the body or stillborn fetus.
The physician or coroner responsible for signing the death or
stillbirth certificate shall authorize final disposition of the body
or stillborn fetus, on a form prescribed and furnished by the
state registrar. If the body is to be cremated, the coroner must
also give additional authorization. In the case of stillbirths, the
hospital may dispose of the stillborn fetus if the parent(s) so
requests; authorization from the coroner is not necessary unless
the coroner is responsible for signing the certificate of
stillbirth."
Illinois (410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/4) (Burial of remains after
study; violations)
"It shall be the duty of preceptors, professors and teachers,
and all officers of medical colleges or schools, public or private,
who shall receive any dead body or bodies, in pursuance of the
provisions of this act, decently to bury, in some public cemetery,
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or to cremate the same in a furnace properly constructed for
that purpose, the remains of all bodies, after they shall have
answered the purposes of study aforesaid, and for any neglect
or violation of the provisions of this act, the party or parties so
violating or neglecting, shall, be guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor."
Indiana (IND. CODE § 36-2-14-16) (Disposition of unclaimed
bodies in Lake and Marion Counties)
"(c)... [T]he coroner may order the burial or cremation of any
unclaimed body left in the coroner's custody."
Iowa (IOWA CODE § 142.1) (Delivery of bodies)
"The body of every person dying in a public asylum, hospital,
county care facility, penitentiary, or reformatory in this state,
or found dead within the state, or which is to be buried at public
expense in this state ... and which is suitable for scientific
purposes, shall be delivered to the medical college of the state
university, or some osteopathic or chiropractic college or school
located in this state ... but no such body shall be delivered to
any such college or school if the deceased person expressed a
desire during the person's last illness that the person's body
should be buried or cremated, nor if such is the desire of the
person's relatives .... In the event the deceased person has not
expressed a desire during the person's last illness that the
person's body should be buried or cremated and should have no
relatives that request the person's body for burial or cremation,
if a friend objects to the use of the deceased person's body for
scientific purposes, said deceased person's body shall be
forthwith delivered to such friend for burial or cremation at no
expense to the state or county. . .
Kansas
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-902a (Delivery of unclaimed bodies to
medical school; notice; expenses; receipts; records)
"It is hereby made the duty of each coroner or any other
officer having charge or control over unclaimed dead human
bodies which would otherwise be buried at public expense or on
grounds reserved exclusively for pauper dead to notify
immediately the chairman or head of the department of
anatomy of the medical school of the university of Kansas,
whenever any such body or bodies come into his possession...
and permit said chairman or his agent to take and remove all
such bodies for use within the state for the advancement of
medical, surgical and anatomical science .... "
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KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-904 (When bodies not to be delivered to
medical school; burial by relatives and friends; unclaimed body of
deceased inmate)
"(a)... No body shall be delivered as provided in K.S.A. 65902a and amendments thereto, if claimed by relatives or friends
within 72 hours after death, nor shall a body be delivered as
provided in K.S.A. 65-902a and amendments thereto unless the
person or persons in charge of the deceased at the time of death
have made diligent search for relatives or friends and no
response to the search has been received within 96 hours after
the commencement of such search. No dead body received by
the department of anatomy of the medical school of the
university of Kansas under the provisions of this act shall be
dissected prior to 60 days after date of receipt of the dead body.
In case the remains of any person so delivered and received
shall be claimed within 60 days by any relative or friend, they
shall be given to such relative or friend for interment."
Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72.450) (Disposal of body and
valuables found thereon)
"(1)... In the event the coroner is unable to locate the spouse,
if any, or next of kin, he or she may cause the body to be buried
at the expense of the fiscal court, consolidated local
government, or urban-county government, whichever is
appropriate.
(3) In lieu of having an unclaimed body buried at public
expense, the coroner may deliver such body or part thereof to a
state medical school .."
Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1551) (Burial of unclaimed
bodies)
"A. (2) The coroner shall have custody of the bodies of all
persons who die within the parish and whose bodies are not
claimed by friends or relatives. If the decedent had no known
property or assets of a sufficient value to defray the expenses of
burial, the coroner shall make such disposition of the body of
the decedent as is otherwise provided by law for indigents."
Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2883) (Disposal of dead
bodies: deaths in almshouses, prisons and institutions)
"All
county
prison,
charge
at the

public officers, agents and servants of any and every
and municipality, and of any and every almshouse,
morgue, hospital or any other public institution having
or control over dead human bodies required to be buried
public expense are required to notify immediately the
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board of distribution.. .to take and remove any and all bodies
to be used within the State for the advancement of medical
education.. .. "
Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 9-604) (Payment of
burial and funeral expenses of indigent inmates)
"(d) Disposition of unclaimed body.-If the body of an
indigent inmate is not claimed within 48 hours after death, the
State Anatomy Board shall take control of the body for final
disposition..."
Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 38, § 13) (Release of Body;
Pronouncement of Death; Waiver of Requirement of Pronouncement
of Death)
"... If the body is unidentified or unclaimed after the
investigation is completed, the medical examiner shall release
it to the department of public welfare, which shall bury it..."
Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAwS § 333.2653) ([A]vailability of
unclaimed bodies to anatomy board; ... release of unclaimed bodies)
"(2)... In the absence of any known relative of the deceased
or a special administrator of the estate of the deceased
appointed by the probate court... the unclaimed body shall
become available to the anatomy board. ...
Minnesota
MINN. STAT. § 525.9213 (Authorization by coroner or medical
examiner or local public health official)
"(a) The coroner or medical examiner may release and permit
the removal of a part from a body within that official's custody,
for transplantation or therapy, if...
(2) the official has made a reasonable effort, taking into account
the useful life of the part, to locate and examine the decedent's
medical records and inform persons listed in section 525.9212,
paragraph (a), of their option to make, or object to making, an
anatomical gift."
MINN. STAT. § 149A.94 (Final disposition)
"Subdivision 1. Generally. Every dead human body lying
within the state, except those delivered for dissection pursuant
to section 525.9213, those delivered for anatomical study
pursuant to section 149A.81, subdivision 2, or lawfully carried
through the state for the purpose of disposition elsewhere; and
the remains of any dead human body after dissection or
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anatomical study, shall be decently buried, entombed, or
cremated, within a reasonable time after death. .. "
Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-39-5) (Disposition of
unclaimed dead bodies)
"Any physician, hospital, funeral director, embalmer, coroner
or other person acquiring possession of a dead human body or
portion thereof which is not claimed for burial or cremation
within forty-eight hours of its acquisition shall give written
notice thereof to the board of supervisors, or a member thereof,
of the county in which the dead body or portion thereof is
located, furnishing such identification of the decedent as may
be available. The board of supervisors shall make reasonable
efforts to notify members of the decedent's family or other
known interested persons, and, if the dead body or portion
thereof shall not be claimed for burial or cremation by any
interested person within five days of the aforementioned
written notice, the board of supervisors shall, as soon as it may
think appropriate, authorize and direct the burial or cremation
and burial of the residue of such dead body or portion
thereof...."
Missouri (Mo. REV. STAT. § 194.150) (Disposal of paupers' bodies)
"Superintendents or wardens of penitentiaries, houses of
correction and bridewells, hospitals, insane asylums and
poorhouses, and coroners, sheriffs, jailers, city and county
undertakers, and all other state, county, town or city officers
having the custody of the body of any deceased person required
to be buried at public expense, shall be and hereby are required
immediately to notify the secretary of the board [Missouri State
Anatomical Board]; ... provided, that each educational
institution receiving a body from the board shall hold such body
for at least thirty days, during which time any relative or friend
of any such deceased person or persons shall have the right to
take and receive the dead body from the possession of any
person in whose charge or custody it may be found, for the
purpose of interment, upon paying the expense of such
interment."
Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-4-2915) (Custody and
disposition of bodies held pending investigation)
"(3) If the identity of a dead human body is unknown or if
those entitled to custody of a body do not claim it, the coroner
shall take custody of the body even if the circumstances of the
death do not otherwise require an inquiry by the coroner."
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Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1002) (Board; dead human
bodies subject to burial or cremation at public expense; delivery to
board; claimant of body; requirements)
"(1) All public officers, agents, and servants of this state, of
every county, city, township, district, and other municipal
subdivision thereof, and of every almshouse, prison, morgue,
hospital, or other institution, having charge, control, or
possession of any dead human body which is not claimed within
the time and in the manner provided by this section are
required to immediately notify the State Anatomical Board, or
such agent, school, college, or person as may be designated by
the board, of the dead human body. Such institution shall,
without fee or reward, surrender and deliver such dead human
body to the board or to such agent, schools, colleges, physicians,
and surgeons as may be designated by the board for anatomical
use and study....
(4) If the duly authorized officer or agent of the board deems
any such body unfit for anatomical purposes, he or she shall
notify the county commissioners of the county in which the
death occurred, and the county commissioners shall then direct
some person to take charge of such body and cause it to be
buried or cremated. The expense of such burial or cremation
shall be fixed and paid by order of the county commissioners
from any funds available for such purpose."
Nevada (NEv. REV. STAT. § 451.400)
"L All public officers, agents or employees of every county,
city or town, every person in charge of any prison, morgue,
hospital, funeral parlor or mortuary, and all other persons
coming into possession, charge or control of any dead human
body which is unclaimed or which is required to be buried at
public expense are hereby required to notify the Committee [on
Anatomical Dissection] immediately, or such person as may
from time to time be designated by the Committee."
New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 611:15) (Unclaimed
Body)
"If a dead body is unidentified or unclaimed for a period of
not less than 48 hours following the view thereof, the medical
examiner shall deliver the body to the overseer of public welfare
in the town or, in the case of an unincorporated place, to a
county commissioner, who shall decently bury or cremate the
body, or, with the consent of the commissioners or the overseer,
it may be sent to the medical department of a medical school or
university, to be used for the advancement of the science of
anatomy and surgery, as provided for by law."
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New Jersey (proposed legislation: S.P.L. 2002, c. 121, Gen.
Assem. 1751 (NJ 2002), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/
2002/Bills/AL02/121.pdf)
"An Act concerning the burial of indigent, unidentified or
unclaimed deceased persons, amending various sections of
statutory law and repealing R.S.44:1-157.
Be It Enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State
of New Jersey:
1. Section 1 of P.L.1987, c.67 (C.40A:9-49.1) is amended to read
as follows:
1. Notwithstanding any provision of law, rule or regulation
to the contrary, when an indigent person dies in his
resident county without a surviving spouse, parent or
emancipated child [and] or in a [municipality] county other
than his resident [municipality] county, the resident
county of the indigent decedent is responsible for the
necessary and reasonable expenses for the burial. For the
purposes of this act, "indigent decedent" means a person
who dies without leaving an ascertainable estate sufficient
to pay part or all of the person's burial expenses and whose
burial expenses are not payable by the State pursuant to
[various enumerated state laws]."
New Mexico (N.M. STAT. § 24-12-2) (Disposition of unclaimed
body; transmission of records of institution)
"A. Upon the issuance of his certificate that the remains are
unclaimed, the medical investigator shall retain the body for
use only for medical education or shall certify that the body is
unnecessary or unsuited for medical education and release it to
the state, county or municipal officials having charge or control
of the body for burial. The state, county or municipal officials
shall have the body removed for disposition within three weeks
from the date on which the medical investigator released the
body."
New York (N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 141) (Burial of the dead)
"2. If, when such provision is made by a public welfare
district, town or city, the deceased leave no funds or insurance
sufficient to pay the expense of his burial and there are no
known relatives, friends or personal representatives liable or
willing to become responsible for such expense, the expense of
such burial shall be a charge on such public welfare district,
town or city but the public welfare official thereof may recover
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the same in whole or in part from the relatives of the deceased
liable therefor."
North Carolina (N.C. GEN.
bodies; ... disposition)

STAT.

§ 130A-415)

(Unclaimed

"(a) Any person, including officers, employees and agents of
the State or of any unit of local government in the State,
undertakers doing business within the State, hospitals, nursing
homes or other institutions, having physical possession of a
dead body shall make reasonable efforts to contact relatives of
the deceased or other persons who may wish to claim the body
for final disposition. If the body remains unclaimed for final
disposition for 10 days, the person having possession shall
notify the Commission of Anatomy. Upon request of the
Commission of Anatomy, the person having possession shall
deliver the dead body to the Commission of Anatomy at a time
and place specified by the Commission of Anatomy or shall
permit the Commission of Anatomy to take and remove the
body.
(b) All dead bodies not claimed for final disposition within 10
days of the decedent's death may be received and delivered by
the Commission of Anatomy pursuant to the authority
contained in G.S. 130A-33.30 and this Part and in accordance
with the rules of the Commission of Anatomy. Upon receipt of a
body by the Commission of Anatomy all interests in and rights
to the unclaimed dead body shall vest in the Commission of
Anatomy. The recipient to which the Commission of Anatomy
delivers the body shall pay all expenses for the embalming and
delivery of the body, and for the reasonable expenses arising
from efforts to notify relatives or others."
North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06-14) (What bodies may
be used for dissection)
"Any medical association, licensed physician and surgeon, or
medical school, upon request, may receive and remove free of
charge the bodies of the following deceased persons, if such
bodies are to be used within the state for the advancement of
anatomical knowledge and medical science and if proper notice
is given to the relatives or guardian of the deceased:
1. A person executed pursuant to sentence of law.
2. A person dying in the penitentiary or county jail while
under sentence for a crime.
3. A person required to be buried at public expense.
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Preference must be given to medical schools, and such
schools shall furnish the bodies to the students of medicine and
surgery.
Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1713.34) (Medical colleges or
embalming board may receive bodies for study or dissection)
"Superintendents
of
city
hospitals,
directors
or
superintendents of city infirmaries, county homes, or other
charitable institutions, directors or superintendents of
workhouses, founded and supported in whole or in part at
public expense, superintendents or managing officers of state
benevolent or correctional institutions, boards of township
trustees, sheriffs, or coroners, in possession of bodies not
claimed or identified, or which must be buried at the expense of
the state, county, or township, before burial, shall notify the
professor of anatomy in a college which by its charter is
empowered to teach anatomy, or the secretary of the board of
embalmers and funeral directors of this state, of the fact that
such bodies are being so held. If after a period of thirty-six
hours the body has not been accepted by friends or relatives for
burial at their expense, such superintendent, director, or other
officer, on the written application of such professor, or the
secretary of the board of embalmers and funeral directors, shall
deliver to such professor or secretary, for the purpose of medical
or surgical study or dissection or for the study of embalming,
the body of any such person who died in any of such institutions
from any disease which is not infectious. The expense of the
delivery of the body shall be borne by the parties in whose
keeping the body was placed."
Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 92) (Ascertainment if deceased
person has relative, friend or representative)
"The warden, superintendent or administrator of any state,
county or municipal institution and any other state, county, or
municipal officer in whose custody shall come the body of any
deceased person, required to be buried at public expense, shall
use reasonable effort to ascertain, if said deceased person has
any relative, friend or other representative who will assume
charge of said body for burial at his or her expense, and if such
effort shall not result in the discovery of a claimant within
twenty-four (24) hours after death, said superintendent,
warden, or other official or person enumerated above, shall
immediately notify said Anatomical Board or such person or
persons as may from time to time be designated by said Board
as its duly authorized officer or agent, whenever such
unclaimed body or bodies come to his or their possession, charge
or control and shall, without fee or reward, surrender except as
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otherwise specifically provided by law, such unclaimed body or
bodies to the Anatomical Board, and permit and suffer the said
Board or its agents to take and remove all such unclaimed
bodies to be used for the advancement of medical and
anatomical sciences ......
Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 97.170) (Disposition of body of indigent
or child in custody of Department of Human Services)
"(1) ... If no one claims the body within five days after death,
or if those notified acquiesce, the funeral service practitioner
shall notify, by telephone, the Demonstrator of Anatomy of the
Oregon Health and Science University. The Demonstrator of
Anatomy, who shall be appointed by the Oregon Health and
Science University Board of Directors from the staff of the
Oregon Health and Science University, shall immediately
inform the funeral service practitioner whether the body is
deemed to be in fit condition and is desired for medical
instruction or the advancement of medical science ..
Pennsylvania (PA. CONS. STAT. § 1092) (Notice to board of bodies
in institutions; ... burial of paupers)
"All public officers, agents, and servants, and all officers,
agents, and servants of any and every county, city, township,
borough, district, and other municipality, and of any and every
almshouse, prison, morgue, hospital, or other municipality, or
other public institution, and all other persons, having charge or
control over dead human bodies required to be buried at the
public expense, are hereby required to notify immediately the
said board of distribution .... and permit and suffer the said
board and its agents to take and remove all such bodies to be
used within the State for the advancement of medical science."
Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18.1-1)
burials)

(Public expense

"Unless the office of the state medical examiners has
established its jurisdiction over the body of a deceased person in
accordance with chapter 4 of this title, whoever has custody of
the body of a deceased person required to be buried at public
expense shall use reasonable efforts to ascertain if the deceased
person has any relative or friend who will assume responsibility
for burial at his or her expense. If no such person is found
within twenty-four (24) hours after death, the person having
custody of the dead body shall notify the director of the
department of human services or his or her designee who shall
arrange for the removal of the unclaimed body. If the body is
not claimed at or before the expiration of thirty (30) hours
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thereafter, the director of the department of human services or
his or her designee shall give public notice of its finding and a
description of the unclaimed body, and within a reasonable time
thereafter cause the body to be decently buried. .. ."
South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-530) (Certain dead
bodies shall be turned over to Board)
"Each officer, agent and servant of every city in the State and
of every almshouse, prison, morgue, hospital, jail or other public
institution in such cities having charge or control of any dead
human body which is required to be buried at the public
expense and every officer or other person having charge or
control of the body of any person upon whom the sentence of
death for crime has been executed under the law shall notify
the Board, or such person or persons as may, from time to time,
be designated by the Board or their duly authorized officer or
agent, whenever and as soon as any such body comes to his
possession, charge or control, and shall, without fee or reward,
deliver such body and permit the Board and its agents, and
such physicians and surgeons as may, from time to time, be
designated by the Board and have given the bond hereafter
required, to take and remove any such body to be used for the
advancement of medical science."
South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 7-14-4) (Offer of body of
indigent to medical school-Burial if not claimed)
"If sufficient property is not found on the body, the coroner
shall forthwith give notice to the dean of the department of
medicine of the university of South Dakota, specifying in such
notice the probable cause of death; and upon the requisition of
the dean of such department, he shall forward such body to the
university at its expense, within twenty-four hours of the
receipt of such requisition. If no such requisition be received
within the time stated, it shall be the duty of the coroner to
cause the body to be properly buried, and the expense thereof
shall be paid by the county from the general fund."
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-4-102) (Disposition of
unclaimed bodies of persons dying in charitable or penal institutions
or to be buried at public expense)
"(a) In order to promote medical and surgical science, and to
provide for the disposition of unclaimed bodies of persons who
die in any charitable or penal institutions, or are delivered to a
public official for the purpose of burial at public expense, the
chief medical examiner appointed pursuant to § 38-7-102 shall
direct such disposition of unclaimed dead bodies, except those of
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honorably discharged veterans which shall be interred as
directed by the commissioner of veterans affairs, or the
commissioner's representative, superseding other provisions of
§§ 68-4-102-68-4-109."
Texas (TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 691.023) (Duty to
Deliver Certain Bodies to Board)
"(a) An officer, employee, or representative of the state, of a
political subdivision, or of an institution having charge or
control of a body not claimed for burial or a body required to be
buried at public expense shall:
(1) notify the board or the board's representative of the
body's existence when the body comes into the person's
possession, charge, or control if notified in writing to do so
by the board or the board's representative;
(2) deliver the body in accordance with the direction of the
board; and
(3) allow the board, the board's representative, or a
physician designated by the board who complies with this
chapter to remove the body to be used for the advancement
of medical science."
Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 53B-17-301) (Unclaimed dead bodiesNotice to School of Medicine)
"(1) Any person who has charge over an unclaimed dead body
that is to be buried at public expense shall notify the dean of
the School of Medicine at the University of Utah within 24
hours after taking charge of the body.
(3) At the dean's request, the person shall forward the body
to the university, at its expense, within 24 hours of receiving
the dean's request.
(4) The delivered body shall be properly embalmed and
preserved for not less than 60 days. If a personal friend or
relative of the deceased person requests the body for a private
burial, during this time period, the person is given possession of
the body."
Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 2302) (Use for advancement of
anatomical science)
"(a) When requested in writing by a practicing physician,
licensed and resident in this state, the officer having charge of
the burial shall deliver the body of a deceased person to be
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buried under section 2301 of this title to the physician to be
used by him for the advancement of anatomical science, unless:
(1) The deceased person is known to have served in the
armed forces of the United States of America, or his spouse
so served.
(2) The deceased person during his last illness made a
request for burial of his body.
(3) A person claiming to be related to the deceased person
requires within forty-eight hours after the death that the
body be buried.
(4) The deceased is a stranger or traveler who dies
suddenly before making himself known.
(5) The deceased is identified as a nonresident of this state
traveling in the state or temporarily living in the state,
unless legal consent is given by the appropriate relative.
(6) The deceased person is known to have executed an
anatomical gift document in accordance with the provisions
of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.
(b) A person receiving a body under subsection (a) of this section
shall not remove it from the state, nor use it for a purpose other
than the study of anatomical science. After he has used the
body, he shall decently bury the remains in a cemetery, at his
own expense. However, if a relative of the deceased person so
requests, the physician shall deliver the remains to him for
burial."
Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-288) (Disposition of dead body;
how expenses paid)
"A.... If no person claims the body, the Commissioner may
accept the body for scientific study as provided in Article 3
(32.1-298 et seq.) of this chapter. If the Commissioner refuses to
accept the body for scientific study, the dead body shall be
accepted by the sheriff of the county or city where death
occurred for proper disposition ....
C. In the case of a person who has been received into the
state corrections system and died prior to his release, whose
body is unclaimed and whose body the Commissioner refuses to
accept for scientific study, the Department of Corrections shall
bear the reasonable expenses for cremation or other disposition
of the body...."
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Washington (1953-55 Op. Att'y Gen. Wash. No. 85)
"3. The primary responsibility for the payment of the funeral
costs rests with the relatives of the decedent or his estate. If
they are not financially able the county must provide for the
disposition of the remains, ultimately, the department of public
assistance must pay the cost of burial of indigent persons
irrespective of whether or not they have been recipients of
public assistance....
6. If such bodies are surrendered to a medical school,
physician or surgeon, the recipient should be required to
assume the responsibility for having the body embalmed. If
within 30 days following death a request for burial is received,
such recipient would have a valid claim for reimbursement."
West Virginia (W.VA. CODE § 18B-4-8) (West Virginia anatomical
board...)
"(c) The board shall be responsible for making requisition for,
receiving and making disposition of the dead human bodies for
the scientific uses and purposes of reputable education
institutions, within the state and elsewhere, having medical,
osteopathy, dentistry or nursing schools....
(d) All dead human bodies which may come under the charge
or control of any mortician, any officer or agent of the
department of welfare or of any county commission or
municipality, or any superintendent, officer or agent having the
supervision of any prison, morgue, hospital or other public
institution in this state and which may be required to be buried
at public expense, shall be subject to the requisition of the
board as provided in this section. No such body shall be
delivered to the board if any person related to the deceased by
blood or marriage shall make a statement in writing to that
effect and shall claim such body for burial or shall make
affidavit that the relative is unable to bear the expense of burial
and desires that the deceased be buried at public expense. This
statement and affidavit may be filed by any such relative with
the person having charge and control of the body of the person
so claimed, either before or after the death of such person."
Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 157.02) (Disposal of unclaimed corpses)
"(1) When an inmate of any state, county or municipal
institution dies, the superintendent or other person in charge of
the institution shall immediately notify a relative of the
decedent. A public officer having the possession or the
disposition of a corpse shall immediately notify a relative of the
decedent. If no relative is known, or discoverable by use of
ordinary diligence, notice may be dispensed with. In addition, if
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the deceased had been an inmate of a state correctional
institution, the department of corrections shall provide written
notification to the relative informing him or her that the
department of corrections, upon request, will provide a copy of
any autopsy report or other report or information pertaining to
the death. The department of corrections shall describe how the
request may be made and shall promptly comply with any such
request.
(3) If the corpse is in the Mendota Mental Health Institute
district, the University of Wisconsin shall be notified that it
may have the corpse. If the corpse is in the Winnebago Mental
Health Institute district, the Medical College of Wisconsin, Inc.,
or any accredited school of mortuary science at Milwaukee shall
be notified that it may have the corpse. The university or school
so notified shall immediately inform the superintendent or
public officer whether it desires to have the corpse. If it does,
the corpse shall be delivered accordingly, properly encased, to
the most available facility for transportation to the consignee,
the consignee to pay the cost of transportation. ...
(5) If the corpse is not disposed of under subs. (1) to (4) , the
superintendent or public officer shall properly bury it."
Wyoming (WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-4-601) (Delivery of unclaimed
bodies for anatomical study)
"... The board of health of any city, town or county in the
state; the mayor or common council of any city, and the officers
or board having direction or control of any almshouse, prison
hospital, house of correction or jail, in the state, shall, when so
requested, surrender the dead bodies of such persons as may be
required to be buried at the public expense, to any regularly
licensed physician or dentist or medical college in the state, in
accordance with such rules as may be prescribed by the state
department of health; such bodies to be used by said physician,
dentist or medical college, for the advancement of anatomical
science; preference being given to the faculty of any legally
organized state medical college or school of anatomy, for their
use in the instruction of medical students. .."

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

APPENDIX

[Vol. 58:1

B: LAWS GOVERNING THE DISPOSITION OF THE INCARCERATED
DEAD, INCLUDING THE EXECUTED

What follows is an inventory of federal and state provisions
governing the disposition of inmates' bodies post-execution. Where
the code or statutory provision was not specific as to post-execution
disposition, I've included excerpts from state codes governing the
disposition of bodies of dead inmates generally.
United States (18 U.S.C. § 3596)
"When the sentence is to be implemented, the Attorney
General shall release the person sentenced to death to the
custody of a U.S. marshal, who shall supervise implementation
of the sentence in the manner prescribed by the law of the State
in which the sentence is imposed. If the law of the State does
not provide for implementation of a sentence of death, the court
shall designate another State, the law of which does provide for
the implementation of a sentence of death, and the sentence
shall be implemented in the latter State in the manner
prescribed by such law."
Alabama (ALA. CODE § 15-18-85(a))
"... [W]hen the sentence is executed, the warden shall return
the warrant [of execution] and [death] certificate with a
statement.., that the body of the convict was decently buried or
delivered to his relatives or friends.. .
Arizona (ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-805)
"The bodies, or portions thereof, of persons executed at the
state prison not claimed by relatives or friends within twentyfour hours after death, may be disposed of for scientific
purposes by the superintendent of the prison, with consent of
the governor .... "
Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-505)
"Upon application of the relatives of the person executed, the
body after execution may be returned to their address and at
their cost."
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California
CAL. PENAL CODE

5022(a))

"Upon the entry of a prisoner into a facility operated by the
Department of Corrections, and at least every year thereafter,
the Director of Corrections shall obtain from the prisoner the
name and last known address and telephone number of any
person or persons who shall be notified in the event of the
prisoner's death ... and who are authorized to receive his or
her body."
CAL. PENAL CODE 5061
"Whenever any person confined in any state institution
subject to the jurisdiction of the Director of Corrections dies,
and no demand or claim is made upon the director or his or her
designee for the body of the deceased inmate by the inmate's
next of kin or legally appointed representative, the director
shall dispose of the body by cremation or burial no sooner than
10 calendar days after the inmate's death. The director or his or
her designee may waive the 10-day waiting period for disposal
of the deceased inmate's body if confirmation is received that
the inmate's next of kin, or legally appointed representative,
refuses to take possession of the body."
Please note that while the above provisions relate to any inmate
who dies while incarcerated, California also provides more
specifically for the disposition of bodies of inmates executed by lethal
injection, directing, "After all witnesses have left, the body is
removed with dignity and care. Typically, the family claims the body.
If not, the State makes the arrangements." California Department of
Corrections,
http://www.corr.ca.gov/CommunicationsOffice/Capital
Punishment/lethalinj ection.asp.
Colorado
No provision regarding disposition of the executed.
Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102)
"The warden or his deputy shall cause the body of any
executed criminal to be decently and quietly buried in any place
in the United States that may be designated by the relatives or
friends of the executed person, provided a request for such
burial has been made to the warden or deputy on or before the
day of execution. The amount of the expenses of the funeral and
burial to be paid by the state shall not exceed one hundred and
fifty dollars ... If the body is not claimed by any relatives or
friends on or before the day of execution, the warden or deputy
shall dispose of it as provided by law for the unclaimed bodies of
criminals who die in the Connecticut Correctional Institution,
Somers."
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Delaware
No provision regarding disposition of the executed.
Florida (FLA. STAT. § 922.11(3))
"The body of the executed person shall be delivered to the
medical examiner for an autopsy. After completion of the
autopsy, the body shall be prepared for burial and, if requested,
released to relatives of the deceased. If a coffm has not been
provided by relatives, the body shall be delivered in a plain coffin.
If the body is not claimed by relatives, it shall be given to
physicians who have requested it for dissection or to be
disposed of in the same manner as are bodies of prisoners
dying in the state prison."
Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-43)

'The body of an executed person shall be delivered to the
relatives of the person if they so desire; and, in case no claim is
made by relatives for the body, it shall be disposed of in the
same manner as bodies of inmates dying in a state correctional
institution."
Idaho
No provision regarding disposition of the executed.
Illinois
Moratorium on death penalty issued by then-Governor Ryan in
2000.
Indiana
No provision regarding disposition of the executed.
Kansas
On December 17, 2004, the Kansas Supreme Court declared the
state's death penalty provision unconstitutional.
As for other inmates who die in prison and whose bodies are
unclaimed:
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-904 (unclaimed body of deceased inmate)
"(b) The unclaimed body of a deceased inmate in the custody
of the secretary of corrections may be cremated at the expense
of the department of corrections."
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Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.270)

"The body of the condemned shall be delivered to any friend
or relative making request for it. The expense for the return of
the body to its home, not to exceed thirty dollars ($ 30), shall be
paid out of the appropriations to the Department of Corrections.
If no request is made, the body shall be buried, and the cost of
the burial, not to exceed thirty dollars ($ 30), shall be paid out
of the appropriations to the Department of Corrections."
Louisiana
No provision regarding disposition of the executed.
Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 3-909)
"(a) Return to relative.-On application of a relative, the
body of an executed inmate shall be returned to the relative at
the relative's cost.
(b) Burial.-If an application is not made under subsection
(a) of this section, the Commissioner shall arrange for burial."
Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-55(4))
"The body of the person so executed shall be released
immediately by the State Executioner, or his duly authorized
representative, to the relatives of the dead person, or to such
friends as may claim the body.... The Commissioner may
donate the unclaimed body of an executed person to the
University of Mississippi Medical Center for scientific purposes.
The county of conviction shall bear the reasonable expense of
burial in the event the body is not claimed by relatives or
friends or donated to the University of Mississippi Medical
Center ......
Missouri
No provision regarding disposition of the executed.
Montana
No provision regarding disposition of the executed.
Nebraska
No provision regarding disposition of the executed.
Nevada
No provision regarding disposition of the executed.
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New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291:1) (Request for
Body)
"It shall be the duty of the county commissioners of any
county, the mayor and aldermen of any city, the overseers of the
poor of any town, the warden of the state prison and the keeper
of any jail in the state, upon previous request in writing by any
physician or surgeon of this state (preference being given to
instructors in medical schools established by law), to notify
such physician or surgeon whenever the body of any person
dying in their county, city, town, or in the state prison or a jail,
required to be buried at the public expense, comes into their
possession, charge or control, and to give permission to such
physician or surgeon to take such body to be by him used within
the state for the advancement of anatomical and medical
science."

New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:49-9)
"(a) Prior to the execution, the inmate shall be given the
opportunity to decide in writing to whom his body shall be
delivered after the execution. The commissioner ... shall sign
and authorize the inmate's request if the request is not
contrary to public policy or law. If the inmate does not
indicate to whom his body shall be delivered or if his request is
contrary to public policy or law, then the body of an inmate who
has been legally executed shall be embalmed immediately and
so directed by the commissioner, unless prior to execution, the
inmate, relative, or bona fide friend indicates that the body
is to be cremated or buried within 48 hours after death. If the
body is not demanded or requested by a relative or bona fide
friend within 72 hours after execution then it shall be delivered
to a duly authorized and incorporated pathological and
anatomical association in the State, if requested by an
authorized association.
(b) If the body is not delivered to a relative, bona fide
friend, or a duly authorized and incorporated pathological
and anatomical association, the commissioner shall cause the
body to be decently buried, and the fee for embalming shall
be paid by the State, and no religious or other services shall
be held over the body after the execution, except within the
facility selected for the execution by the department, and no one
shall be present at the service except the officers of the
prison, the person conducting the services and relatives by
blood or marriage of the person executed."
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New Mexico
No provision regarding disposition of the executed.
As for other inmates who die while incarcerated:
N.M. STAT. § 24-12-2 (Disposition of unclaimed body)
"C. If a deceased person was an inmate of a public
institution, the institution shall transmit, upon request of the

medical investigator, a brief medical history of the unclaimed
dead person for purposes of identification and permanent
record. The records shall be open to inspection by any state or
county official or district attorney."
New York (N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 6 62)
"1. Prior to the execution, the convicted person shall be given
the opportunity to decide in writing to whom his or her body
shall be delivered after the execution. The commissioner or his
or her designee shall sign and authorize the convicted person's
request if the request is not contrary to law. If the convicted
person does not indicate to whom such person's body shall be
delivered, or if the person's request is contrary to law, the
commissioner may deliver the convicted person's body to a
relative by blood or marriage or a bona fide friend. If the body is
not claimed by a relative or bona fide friend within seven days
after execution, the body shall be delivered to a duly authorized
and incorporated pathological and anatomical association in the
state, if requested by an authorized association.
2. If the body of the convicted person is not claimed by a
relative, bona fide friend, or a duly authorized and incorporated
pathological and anatomical association, the commissioner
shall cause the body to be disposed of in the same manner as
are bodies of prisoners dying in the institution. Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, no autopsy shall be required for the
body of an inmate upon whom a sentence of death has been
carried out."
North Carolina
No provision regarding disposition of the executed.
Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.26)
"The body of an executed convict shall be returned for burial
in any county of the state, to friends who made written request
therefor, if made to the warden the day before or on the
morning of the execution. The warden may pay the
transportation and other funeral expenses, not to exceed fifty
dollars.

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1

If no request is made by such friends therefor, such body shall
be disposed of as provided by section 1713.34 of the Revised
Code [Medical colleges or embalming board may receive bodies
for study or dissection; procedure] and the rules of the director of
job and family services."
Oklahoma
No provision regarding disposition of the executed.
Oregon
No provision regarding disposition of the executed.
Please note that while the Oregon Revised Statutes contain no
provision directing the disposition of bodies of executed inmates, the
Oregon Department of Corrections does follow specific execution
procedures and describespost-execution proceedings as follows:
"The assistant superintendent, Security, will remain to
supervise the removal of the body. The body is released to a
funeral home after the body is properly identified using
identification photographs for comparison. The State Police are
notified when the execution is complete and the body is ready
for removal.
The inmate's predesignated contact person will be notified to
contact the funeral home to which the inmate's body was taken.
This contact person will also receive the inmate's personal
property and any amount of money in the inmate's trust
account, after deducting any expenses incurred by the
department and related to the death of the inmate."
Oregon Department of Corrections Public Affairs Capital
Punishment in Oregon, http://www.oregon.gov/DOC/PUBAFF/cappunishment/capital-punishment.shtml.
Pennsylvania (61 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3007)
"Immediately after execution, a postmortem examination of
the body of the inmate shall be made at the discretion of the
coroner of the county in which the execution is performed. The
coroner shall report the nature of any examination
made.... After the postmortem examination, unless claimed by
a relative or relatives, the department shall be responsible for
disposition of the body."
South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-570)
"The body of the person executed shall be delivered to his
relatives. If no claim is made by relatives for such body it shall
be disposed of as bodies of convicts dying in the State
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Penitentiary. If the nearest relatives of a person so executed
desire that the body be carried to such person's former home, if
in the State, the expenses for such transportation shall be paid
by the Penitentiary authorities, who shall draw their warrant
upon the county treasurer of the county from which such
convict came and such county treasurer shall pay such expenses
and charge to the item of court expenses."
South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-39)
"After the post-mortem examination the body of the
defendant, unless claimed by some relative, shall be interred in
a cemetery within the county where the penitentiary is
situated."
Tennessee
No provision regarding disposition of the executed.
Texas (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.25)
"The body of a convict who has been legally executed shall be
embalmed immediately and so directed by the Director of the
Department of Corrections. If the body is not demanded or
requested by a relative or bona fide friend within forty-eight
hours after execution then it shall be delivered to the
Anatomical Board of the State of Texas, if requested by the
Board. If the body is requested by a relative, bona fide friend, or
the Anatomical Board of the State of Texas, such recipient shall
pay a fee of not to exceed twenty-five dollars to the mortician
for his services in embalming the body for which the mortician
shall issue to the recipient a written receipt. When such receipt
is delivered to the Director of the Department of Corrections,
the body of the deceased shall be delivered to the party named
in the receipt or his authorized agent. If the body is not
delivered to a relative, bona fide friend, or the Anatomical
Board of the State of Texas, the Director of the Department of
Corrections shall cause the body to be decently buried, and the
fee for embalming shall be paid by the county in which the
indictment which resulted in conviction was found."
Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-12)
"After the execution, the executive director of the
Department of Corrections or his designee shall make a return
upon the death warrant, showing the time, place, and manner
in which it was executed."
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Virginia
VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-236
"Upon application of the relatives of the person executed, the

remains after execution shall be returned to their address and
at their cost. If no such application is made within three days of
the date of execution, the provisions [below] shall apply."
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-298 (Notification of Commissioner and
delivery of bodies)
"Any person having charge or control of any dead human
body which is unclaimed for disposition, which is required to be
buried at the public expense, or which has been lawfully
donated for scientific study shall notify the Commissioner
whenever and as soon as any such body comes to his possession,
charge or control and shall, without fee or reward, permit the
Commissioner or his agents to remove such body, to be used for
the advancement of health science."

Washington
No provision regarding disposition of the executed. As for other
inmates who die while incarcerated:
1953-55 Op. Att'y Gen. Wash. No. 85
"1. State institutions have no authority to embalm, bury,
cremate or otherwise dispose of unclaimed bodies of deceased
inmates.
2. The jurisdiction of unclaimed bodies of deceased inmates is
vested in the coroner of the county in which the inmates died."
Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-915)
"The body of any prisoner who has been executed shall be
decently buried at the expense of the state, unless the body is
claimed by any relative or friend in which case the body may be
delivered to the relative or friend for the purpose of burial."

The following states do not have the death penalty, and therefore
have no provisions for the disposition of bodies following execution:
Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin.146

146. Death Penalty Information Center, Studies Comparing States with and
without the Death Penalty, at www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=12&did=167
(enumerating states without death penalty today).

